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Anonymus Iamblichi, On Excellence
(Peri Aret!s)
A Lost Defense of Democracy
Phillip Sidney Horky
1. Introduction
Scholars of ancient philosophy are confounded by few greater challenges than assigning an
author to an authorless text; this is surely the case with the text commonly known as the
Anonymus Iamblichi (or, the “anonymous text derived from Iamblichus”).! In 1889, the
German philologist Friedrich Blass isolated a section of chapter 20 from Iamblichus’
Exhortation to Philosophy" (mid-third century !") as an extract from a lost sophistic
work from the !fth century #!"; some twenty years before, Bywater had discovered
that large sections of Iamblichus’ Exhortation were constituted of extensive quotations of
classical Greek authors, including Aristotle’s own lost Exhortation, and Blass extended
Bywater’s theory by hypothesizing that the twentieth chapter of his work had the
appearance of a continuous treatise.# Blass believed that Iamblichus had preserved
portions of Antiphon’s lost On Concord (!"#! "$%&%'()), a hypothesis that is now no
longer accepted by anyone (to my knowledge), although the more formal point concern-
ing authorship remained, and various scholars have taken a stab at authenticating the
textual extracts as the work of Antisthenes (K. Joël),! Critias (Wilamowitz-Möllendorff ),"
Protagoras (Töpfer),# Hippias (Gomperz and Untersteiner),$ or Democritus (Cataudella
! Recent editions with complete translation of Anonymus Iamblichi include: (English) A. Laks and G.W. Most,
Early Greek Philosophy IX: Sophists, Part 2 [Sophists], Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA, 2016), 140–63;
D. Graham, The Texts of Early Greek Philosophy: The Complete Fragments and Selected Testimonies of the Major
Presocratics, Part II (Cambridge, 2010), 863–76; (Italian) A. Ciriaci, L’Anonimo di Giamblico: Saggio critico e
analisi dei frammenti [L’Anonimo] (Naples, 2011); M. Mari, in D. Musti and M. Mari, Anonimo di Giamblico, La
pace e il benessere: Idee sull’ economia, la società, la morale [Anonimo] (Milan, 2003). The edition of Iamblichus’
Protrepticus by E. des Places, Jamblique: Protreptique (Paris, 1989) provides a translation into French, as does the
edition of F. Romano, Giamblico: Summa Pitagorica (Milan, 2006), into Italian. Also worthy of mention are the
translations of the fragments into English (without Greek text) by J. Dillon and T. Gergel, eds., The Greek Sophists
[Sophists] (London, 2003), 310–8; and by M. Gagarin and P. Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought from Homer
to the Sophists (Cambridge, 1995), 290–5.
" The text is entitled!#%*#"+*,-#) $+! .,/%0%.'(&, which I translate Exhortation to Philosophy (or Exhortation,
for short). It is commonly referred to in the scholarly literature by its Latin name, Protrepticus.
# See F. Blass, De Antiphonte sophista Iamblichi auctore (Kiel, 1889). H. Pistelli had only recently published his
1888 edition of Iamblichus’ Protrepticus, Iamblichi Protrepticus ad !dem codicis Florentini (Leipzig, 1888).
! K. Joël, “Die scheinbaren Antiphonfragmente bei Jamblichos,” in Der echte und der Xenophontische Sokrates,
3 volumes (Berlin, 1893–1901), in Vol. 2.2 (1901), 673–704.
" U. von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, Aristoteles und Athen, 2 volumes (Berlin, 1893), in vol. 1, 174 n. 77.
# K. Töpfer, Zu der Frage über die Autorschaft des 20. Kap. des Iamblichischen Protreptikos (Gmunden, 1907).
$ H. Gomperz, Sophistik und Rhetorik: Das Bildungsideal des "% /12",& in seinem Verhältnis zur Philosophie des
V. Jahrhunderts (Leipzig, 1912), 12; M. Untersteiner, “Un nuovo frammento dell’ Anonymus Iamblichi:
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and Cole).% Most scholars working on the text today, including the most recent editors of
the text, plead skepticism on the issue of authorship; and although I will seek to follow
Cataudella and others in pursuing, in particular, the fruits of comparison with the ethical
fragments associated with the Democritean corpus, I will refrain from making any !rm
claims about historical authorship of the text.& At all events, scholars since Blass have
generally agreed on two points: (a) chapter 20 of Iamblichus’ Exhortation does indeed
preserve a more-or-less continuous treatise that dates to the classical period; and (b) this
extract dates to around 400 #!"—an exception being Domenico Musti and Manuela
Mari, who would date it instead to the mid-fourth century #!".!' For our purposes it
suf!ces to say that the text was composed at the end of the !fth century #!" in the
vicinity of the Socratics—including Plato and Xenophon—and the Sophists, and that its
arguments resonate in various ways with the !gures listed earlier, and especially with the
ethical fragments ascribed to Democritus (along with pseudo-Archytas, whose On Law
and Justice is seldom brought to bear on the text of Anonymus Iamblichi; it is discussed
elsewhere in this volume).!!
The text of Anonymus Iamblichi, which I will call On Excellence (!"#! &#"*')) for
reasons that I will shortly present, is rightly included in this volume on early Greek ethics.
Owing to its obscurity especially in the Anglophone world, in terms of scholarship relating
to pre-Platonic philosophy and to ancient political theory,!" I will introduce On Excellence
by appeal to its two main contexts (source preservation and original historical composi-
tion), translate and discuss all eight surviving fragments in their entirety, and provide some
closing remarks about its importance to this history of democratic thought. The text itself
is notable for its presentation of a series of very carefully interwoven arguments concerning
the three “parts” of excellence (&#"*3)—wisdom, courage, and eloquence—and their
successful application in society. In the course of presenting this case, Anonymus
Iamblichi comments on the conditions under which one should learn to be excellent
(Fragments 1–2) and the ends to which one should direct one’s excellence (Fragments
3–4); he provides an anthropological discussion of the weaknesses of human psychology
and its effects on the good man (Fragments 5–6) and a hypothetical thought experiment
concerning the “Superman” (which naturally solicits comparison with Nietzsche’s
übermensch) and his inability to overcome the multitude in a lawless state (Fragments 6
Identi!cazione dell’ Anonimo con Ippia,” in Scritti minori: Studi di letteratura e !loso!a greca (Brescia, 1971),
422–39.
% Q. Cataudella, “L’Anonymus Iamblichi e Democrito,” Studi italiani di !lologia classica 10 (1932), 5–22 and
“Chi è l’Anonimo di Giamblico?” Revue des Études Grecques 63 (1950), 74–106. A. T. Cole, Jr., “The Anonymus
Iamblichi and His Place in Greek Political Theory,” HSCP 65 (1961), 127–63.
& Much of what I will argue corresponds to the conclusions of M. R. Johnson in his own contribution to this
volume on Democritus (chapter 11).
!' For an excellent analysis of the history of the text, its reception, and its authorship, see Ciriaci, L’Anonimo,
29–51.
!! Ciriaci, L’Anonimo, 24, mentions pseudo-Archytas’ On Wisdom, which is also quoted extensively by
Iamblichus in the Exhortation, but does not draw any further connections.
!" A few examples of major works (by scholars whom I rate highly) on ancient ethics, politics, and philosophy
that do not mention Anonymus Iamblichi: the contributions to R. Balot, A Companion to Greek and Roman
Political Thought (Malden, MA, 2013); P. Cartledge, Ancient Greek Political Thought in Practice (Cambridge,
2009); the contributions to C. Rowe and M. Scho!eld, The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political
Thought (Cambridge, 2002); G. S. Kirk, J. E. Raven, and M. Scho!eld, The Presocratic Philosophers, second edition
(Cambridge, 1983).
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and 8); and he offers a positive defense of law and justice, re"ecting a pro-democratic
philosophical perspective (Fragments 7–8)—a rara avis indeed in ancient philosophy.
Prior to translation and analysis of these arguments, I want to discuss brie"y its most
important contexts: its local preservation within Iamblichus’ Exhortation, and the probable
context of the text’s production in late !fth- to mid-fourth-century #!" Greece.
2. Context of Preservation: Iamblichus’ Exhortation
to Philosophy (c.300 !")
An analysis of the overall structure and themes of Iamblichus’ Exhortation helps us to
understand how the preservation of Anonymus Iamblichi is conditioned by Iamblichus’
project of composing an exhortation to Pythagorean philosophy.!# The general structure of
Iamblichus’ Exhortation is preserved in a table of contents, which aids in our investigation
when placed alongside the order of passages quoted by Iamblichus:
Chapter
(pp. in Pistelli’s ed.)
Topic Author, Work Quoted/
Extracted
Ch. 1. (pp. 6.12–8.9) Introduction + universality and tripartite
division of Pythagorean philosophy
——
Ch. 2. (pp. 8.10–10.13) Generally accepted precepts that support
exhortation to Pythagorean philosophy
——
Ch. 3. (pp. 10.14–16.10) Pythagorean precepts in verse Pythagoras, Golden Verses
Ch. 4. (pp. 16.11–24.13) Scienti!c approaches which support
exhortation to theoretical philosophy
[ps-]Archytas, On Wisdom!!
Ch. 5. (pp. 24.14–36.26) Pythagorean exhortations that improve
those of other philosophical schools
Plato, Euthydemus,
Clitophon, Alcibiades I, Laws,
Timaeus Republic;
Aristotle, Protrepticus!"




Ch. 7. (pp. 41.6–45.3) Particular invitations to theoretical
philosophy from human nature/
experience
Aristotle, Protrepticus
!# Iamblichus’ Exhortation was the second book in Iamblichus’ Compendium of Pythagorean Doctrines (or, an
alternate title, On Pythagoreanism), after his On the Pythagorean Way of Life, which survives. A comprehensive
discussion of the structure and project of this set of treatises is D. J. O’Meara, Pythagoras Revived: Mathematics
and Philosophy in Late Antiquity (Oxford, 1989), 30–44. The most important recent work on Iamblichus’
methodology of quotation and citation is D. S. Hutchinson and M. R. Johnson, “Authenticating Aristotle’s
Protrepticus,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 29 (2005), 193–294. In this section, I adopt a similar approach
to the quotation of Anonymus Iamblichi in Iamblichus’ Exhortation as I did with ps-Archytas’ On Wisdom, in
P. S. Horky, “Pseudo-Archytas’ Protreptics? On Wisdom in its Contexts [“Ps-Archytas”],” in D. Nails and
H. Tarrant, Second Sailing: Alternative Perspectives on Plato (Helsinki, 2015), 21–39.
!! The text is probably the same as OnWisdom of ps-Perictione, but Iamblichus cites Archytas of Tarentum as
the author here. See Horky, “Ps-Archytas,” 33–4.
!" Or, possibly, Porphyry (compare de Abst. I.33.3–4).
264 .-+,,+. *+/%"' -&01'
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My purpose in drawing up this schema is to illustrate how Iamblichus’ arrangement of his
Exhortation works on at least three levels: !rst, at the thematic level, there is a somewhat
haphazard argumentative progression from the more universal to the more particular,
from the theoretical to the practical and political, from the soul to the body!$—and back
again; second, at the level of quotation, there is a ring-composition, with a progression
of Pythagoras (chapter 3)—Archytas (chapter 4)—Plato (chapters 5–6)!%—Aristotle
(chapters 5–12)—Plato (chapters 13–19)—Anonymus Iamblichi (chapter 20)—Pythagoras
(chapter 21);!& and !nally, there is a near ring-composition of medium, gnomic verse
Ch. 8. (pp. 45.4–48.25) Reminders that arise out of common
notions that philosophy takes precedence
over other desirables
Aristotle, Protrepticus
Ch. 9. (pp. 49.1–54.9) Approach to the protreptic that arises out
of nature’s desire according to Pythagoras’
response to the citizens of Phlius
Aristotle, Protrepticus
Ch. 10. (pp. 54.10–56.12) Proof that theoretical philosophy presents
practical advantages for daily life . . .
Aristotle, Protrepticus
Ch. 11. (pp. 56.13–59.18) and that joy excels for those who choose
the intellectual life
Aristotle, Protrepticus
Ch. 12. (pp. 59.19–61.4) Approach to exhortation from the fact that
philosophy leads to complete happiness
Aristotle, Protrepticus or
another dialogue (?)
Ch. 13. (pp. 61.5–72.8) Approaches to exhortation according to
the Pythagorean hypotheses and true
opinions concerning the soul
Plato, Phaedo, Menexenus,
Apology
Ch. 14. (pp. 72.9–77.28) Impulses to exhortation from the
philosophical life
Plato, Theaetetus
Ch. 15. (pp. 78.1–82.9) Exhortation concerning education and
ignorance
Plato, Republic
Ch. 16. (pp. 82.10–83.28) Other approaches concerning education
and its fruits
Plato, Republic
Ch. 17. (pp. 84.1–85.28) Suggestions arising out of ancient precepts
and myths that exhort the temperate,
balanced, well-organized life
Plato, Gorgias
Ch. 18. (pp. 86.1–88.4) Exhortation according to the proper
arrangement of the body
Plato, Gorgias






Counsels “mixed” with exhortations that





The “symbolic” exhortation, explanation
of the Pythagorean symbols
Pythagoras, Symbola
!# Speci!cally, the summary of chapter 20 reads: “Counsels mixed with exhortations in common ($"$,2$1&(,
(+%4'-(, +#%*#%+()) -%,&*) that extend to all the goods, and to all the parts of philosophy, and the ends of life, at
which virtue aims.”
!$ Compare Iamblichus’ treatment of justice (!"#! 5,-(,%06&7)) (Iambl. VP 167–8, pp. 94.13–95.10 Deubner-
Klein).
!% There is apparently an overlap in chapters 5–6 between Aristotle and Plato, although, to be sure, the Aristotle
“quotations” are not guaranteed.
!& I owe this observation to Monte Ransome Johnson, who, in an inspired conversation in 2009, deduced from
this evidence that the Anonymus Iamblichi could be Archytas of Tarentum. There are several reasons, however, to
exclude this possibility: !rst, in chapter 3, Iamblichus cites Archytas by name, but he does not refer the extract of
Anonymus Iamblichi to any author; and second, the text is in Attic, with some Ionicisms, rather than Doric
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(Pythagoras)—prose treatise (Archytas)—dialogue (Plato, Aristotle, Plato)—prose treatise
(Anonymus Iamblichi)—gnomic sententiae (Pythagoras). Hence, at the ends of the work are
Pythagoras’ Golden Verses and Symbols; Aristotle’s dialogue (mostly, but perhaps not only,
his own lost Exhortation) !ttingly occupies the middle, with Plato’s dialogues "anking
Aristotle’s in close proximity; and Archytas and Anonymus Iamblichi, writing in prose,
are closer to Pythagoras’ wisdom statements on either end.
The placement of Anonymus Iamblichi in this structure would encourage us to consider
how it could be possible that Iamblichus considered this author at some level
“Pythagorean”—or at least how his ideas dovetail with (what Iamblichus took to be)
Pythagorean ethical commitments. Speaking about the organization of his Exhortation
in the introduction, Iamblichus describes the section prior to Pythagoras’ symbols (i.e., the
section in which he quotes Anonymus Iamblichi’s text) in these terms:
After this, one should employ a certain middle approach, neither entirely popular nor
Pythagorean in a strict sense (%+*" +(&*8+(0, 57$95", %+*" $,& -&*,-#:) !:4(2%#,-*),
nor completely alienated from each of these two modes either. In this way, we will arrange
the common encouragements to all philosophy, so that they are kept separate from the
Pythagorean intention . . . (Iamblichus, Exhortation to Philosophy 1, p. 7.18–23 Pistelli)"'
Whatever Iamblichus really means here by the “common encouragements,” it is clear that
the section of his Exhortation that quotes Anonymus Iamblichi preserves a “middle” or
“mixed” type of exhortation, once that is neither “entirely popular” (+(&*8+(0, 57$95",)
nor “strictly Pythagorean” (-&*,-#:) !:4(2%#,-*)."!We should pause on this !nal phrase,
because it is liable to confuse us: does Iamblichus mean that the text of Anonymus
Iamblichi is not Pythagorean in any way, or simply not Pythagorean in the strongest
sense? What does Iamblichus mean when he speaks of a person, or a mode of exhortation,
as “Pythagorean, strictly speaking” (-&*,-#:) !:4(2%#,-*)?
It is clear that, by “Pythagorean, strictly speaking,” Iamblichus means truly Pythagorean,
in the sense of presenting esoteric doctrines that are contrasted with the exoteric, or
“popular,” expressions of philosophy, accessible to everyone."" For Iamblichus, esoteric
Pythagoreans were those who heard Pythagoras himself, the so-called “acousmatics,”
whereas exoteric Pythagoreans were those who knew Pythagoreanism through second-
hand sources only and remained outside the close circle of Pythagoras’ followers, the
so-called “mathematicians.”"# Hence, the text of Anonymus Iamblichi would appear to
(which all the texts of Archytas and ps-Archytas adopt). A more plausible scenario, to be investigated later in this
chapter, is that Iamblichus included the extract at this point because he believed its author to be a Pythagorean, or
at least to re"ect ideas that communicate the “middle” or “mixed” approach to exhortation to philosophy, just as
the On Wisdom of ps-Archytas does.
"' For translations of Iamblichus’ Exhortation to Philosophy, I bene!t from the yet unpublished draft of
D. S. Hutchinson and M. R. Johnson.
"! This phrase is all but ignored in modern discussions of Anonymus Iamblichi. It is mentioned by Musti,
Anonimo, 65, although its implications are not explored. It is not clear that, for Iamblichus’ purposes, there is any
difference between “mixed” and “middle” approaches to exhortation.
"" On the differences between symbolic and “popular” (57$95",) modes of philosophical expression, see Iambl.
VP 103–5, pp. 59.17–61.12 Deubner-Klein.
"# See Iambl. Protr. 21, pp. 104.26–105.18 Pistelli; VP 81, pp. 46.26–47.3 Deubner-Klein; 86–9, pp. 50.6–52.19
Deubner-Klein; Comm. math. 25, pp. 76.16–78.8 Festa-Klein. On further differences between esoteric and exoteric
Pythagoreans, including political divisions along aristocratic versus democratic lines, see P. S. Horky, Plato and
Pythagoreanism [Plato] (Oxford, 2013), 7–35 and 85–124.
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constitute—at least in the eyes of Iamblichus—a middle mode of philosophical expression
that blends esoteric and exoteric strands of Pythagoreanism, without being fully reducible
to either. The ring-composition mentioned earlier, which ostensibly pairs pseudo-
Archytas’ On Wisdom with On Excellence of Anonymus Iamblichi, would encourage us
to re"ect upon the similarities between these works. It is clear that Iamblichus considered
the works ascribed to Archytas of Tarentum, including On Wisdom (which Iamblichus of
course thought to be genuine), as re"ecting the “mixed” mode of exhortation: he claims as
much in an analysis of a passage from that text, on the grounds that it “has blended the
common nature with the particular nature, so that they possess harmony in relation to one
another.”"! For Iamblichus, the common or universal nature is what is more divine, and
the particular or individual nature is what is more human; hence, both ps-Archytas and
Anonymus Iamblichi are taken to re"ect the mixed or middle mode of exhortation, which
aims to demonstrate how the gods and humans are conjoined in harmony."" This is
con!rmed by Iamblichus’ introduction to the extracts of Anonymus Iamblichi:
Therefore, I think not unsuitable in this circumstance the exhortation through counsels,
which already somehow approximates the guidance on how one should live, and what it
expresses most of all is that the parts of philosophical reason are not scattered, but all
continuous in relation to one another. Now according to this very procedure, we !rst
begin from those that are most honorable, since one needs training to honor
god . . . Furthermore, it is right to know the capacity of each of the laws and how to
make use of them; but it is not possible to learn these things without knowing virtue
(&#"*3),"# to which we refer both the capacity and the use of the laws, and pro!ciency in
virtue obtains by means of philosophy, with the result that philosophy is an authority in
relation to this [sc. virtue] as well. Furthermore, one should know how to associate with
humans, but someone will not determine this without examining the account of what is
appropriate in the case of all actions ($, *#& *%. +#%03-%&*%) &+%/%2,0$#& $+! +(0/& */&
+#8;"<& $+"0-"$$1&%)), knowing the worthiness and the unworthiness of each human,
and being capable of distinguishing the habits and the natures of each of them, and the
capacities of the soul, and the arguments suited to all these things. And yet, surely none of
these obtains without philosophy, and so it [sc. philosophy] would be useful for their sake.
(Iamblichus, Exhortation to Philosophy 20, pp. 93.26–94.5, 94.14–29 Pistelli)
"! Iambl. Protr. 4, pp. 20.15–21.1 Pistelli: “[Archytas] also posits another approach, the mixed one, which
exhorts to the same things in the following way: ‘For the human has been born and constituted for the purpose of
contemplating the reason of the nature of the universe; and, therefore, it is the function of wisdom to <obtain> and
contemplate the intelligence of the things-that-are’ [ps-Archytas, OnWisdom Fragment 3 = p. 44.17–20 Thesleff].
Indeed, we say that what is mixed among these [words] is this: he has blended the common with the particular
nature, so that they possess harmony in relation to one another. For if the reason of humankind exists in the
reason of the ‘nature of the universe,’ and if the wisdom of humankind obtains and contemplates ‘the intelligence
of the things-that-are,’ not only is there agreement between the portion of reason and the portion of the intelligible
nature of the universe, but also the exhortation becomes more perfect.”
"" See Iambl. Protr. 6, pp. 36.27–37.11 Pistelli.
"# The standard translation for &#"*3 is “virtue,” in the speci!c sense of “moral or ethical excellence.” This
becomes a standard understanding in ancient philosophy starting from, at the latest, Plato. But, prior to Plato, it
tends to mean more generally “excellence,” whether moral or ethical or some other—a meaning that, in my
opinion, &#"*3 obtains in the text of Anonymus Iamblichi. Hence, I will consistently translate &#"*3 with the more
general term “excellence” in reference to Anonymus Iamblichi, but will opt for the more speci!c term “virtue” in
reference to Plato and the Socratics, as well as all philosophers subsequent to them (including Iamblichus).
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As this passage makes clear, Anonymus Iamblichi’s work is taken to exemplify the
continuous relations between theoretical and practical philosophy, and between the gods
and humans. As Iamblichus argues, the relationship between gods and humans, and
between the theoretical and practical parts of philosophy, is mediated by virtue (&#"*3),
which can only be attained through training in philosophy."$ Iamblichus maintains that
virtue is closely tied to law and the laws, but in appealing to practical philosophy, which
constitutes the knowledge of how to associate with other human beings, Iamblichus lists
the criteria that make up our understanding of right action towards other humans,
including comprehension of their relative worth, habits, natures, psychic capacities, and
the arguments that are properly suited to them."% The text of Anonymus Iamblichi is taken
by Iamblichus as an exemplary model of the “middle” mode of exhortation, which
recognizes the importance of virtue (&#"*3) for human social interactions, and the
fundamentality of philosophy for understanding the proper application of our knowledge
concerning other human beings."&
Now that we have a better sense of why Iamblichus includes the text of Anonymus
Iamblichi, in relation to the project of exhortation to Pythagorean philosophy, we can leap
backwards almost 700 years to the chronological context for the production of this text, in
classical Greece, around the end of the !fth century #!".
3. Context of Production: Social Contract Theory
in the Late Fifth Century #!" (?)
In the famous second sailing of Plato’s Republic, Socrates and Glaucon, !nding the debate
conducted with Thrasymachus in Book 1 unsatisfactory, set out to discuss justice anew by
summarizing the opinion of a certain “countless others” (&-%6<& . . . $:#'<& -//<&).#' In so
doing, they tell us something important about roughly contemporary texts like On
Excellence of Anonymus Iamblichi, which hypothesized a social contract in the context
of praising law and justice:
So now you’re going to hear about the !rst subject I said I’d discuss, the nature and origins
of justice. What they [the countless others] say is that doing injustice is naturally a good
thing and being a victim of it a bad thing, but that the badness of having it done to one
outweighs the goodness of doing it; so that whenever people treat each other unjustly and
get a taste of what it’s like both to do it and to have it done to them, those who aren’t able
to choose the one while avoiding the other decide that they’ll gain by making a contract –
"$ The fragments of ps-Archytas’ On Wisdom reveal a text chie"y concerned with expounding theoretical
philosophy; it is Iamblichus, through his exegesis of that text, who seeks to make the work more pragmatic in
nature. See Horky, “Ps-Archytas,” 29–32.
"% Compare Iamblichus’ discussion of Pythagorean justice at VP 179–81, pp. 100.3–101.14 Deubner-Klein.
"& For example, Iamblichus (VP 130, p. 74.4–10 Deubner-Klein) attributed to Pythagoras the discovery of “the
whole of political education” ("(#"*,& . . . *') +%/,*,-') 0/7) +(,5"'()) and the claim that “nothing among
[political] affairs as they are is pure [sc. unmixed]” ($751& "2/,-#,&1) "3&(, */& 4&*<& +#(2$8*<&).
#' Pl. R. 2, 358d20–1. Note that Glaucon adapts the core premise of Thrasymachus’ argument (i.e., that justice
is what is in the interest of the stronger, and when the stronger commit an injustice against the weaker in their own
interest, this is a just act) in the presentation of the opinions of the “countless others.” Hence, it is slightly
misleading to refer to the social contract theory expounded by Glaucon as being “di chiara ispirazione !lotrasi-
machea” (Ciriaci, L’Anonimo, 155)—inspired by Thrasymachus, yes, within the context of the dialogue, but not
beholden to it.
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to ban the doing of injustice, and so being the victim of it as well. It’s from there, so the
story goes, that they start establishing laws, as contracts with each other, calling what is
prescribed by the law “lawful” and “just” (-(! $&*".4"& 5, -#;(04(, &=$%:) *'4"04(, -(!
0:&43-() ((*/&, -(! 5&%$80(, *# (+# *%. &=$%: $+,*82$( &=$,$=& *" -(! 5'-(,%&); and that,
people say, is the origin and the essence of justice (-(! "3&(, 5, *(6*7& 21&"0'& *" -(! %60'(&
5,-(,%06&7)) – something in between ($& $107) what’s best for us, acting unjustly and
getting away with it, and what’s worst of all, being the victim of injustice and being
powerless to get one’s own back. Being in the middle like this, between the two things,
what’s “just” is something a person is content to live with, not because it’s good, but
because it makes up for one’s lack of strength to do justice; anyone who can do it, they say,
and is truly a man, wouldn’t ever make this contract, “not to do or to be the victim of
injustice,” with anybody at all – he’d be crazy to do any such thing. So this, Socrates, or
something like it, is the nature of justice, as the theory goes, and this is the sort of origin it
has (8 $1& %%& 5, .60,) 5,-(,%06&7) . . . -(! $; 9& +1.:-"). (Pl. Rep. 2, 358e2–359b7;
translated by Rowe)
Glaucon suggests that one must go through the arguments of those “countless others”
before moving onto the de!nition of what justice really is. Scholars have long noted the
signi!cance of this passage for placing Plato’s thought within the larger context of Greek
political discourse about the social contract: the eminent Republic commentator James
Adam adduces comparisons with Euripides (Phoenissae l. 509), the sophist Lycophron
(DK 83 Fragment 3), and both Callicles (Grg. 482e2–483c9) and the Athenian Stranger
(Laws 690b7–c3) from Plato’s own works.#! G. B. Kerferd goes further by adding Hippias
(DK 86 A14), the author of the famous Sisyphus fragment (Euripides or Critias? DK 88
B 25), Protagoras (as represented in the “Great Speech” of Plato’s Protagoras, at
320c3–328d2), Democritus (DK 68 B 250 and B 255), and, in the broader context of
isonomia, even Herodotus’ constitutional debate in Persia (3.80–2) and Pericles’ funeral
oration in Thucydides (2.37.1).#" “Countless” indeed were the “others” who provided a
natural explanation of the emergence of a social contract, and it is within this larger
environment of intellectual debates in this period that we should contextualize the argu-
ments of Anonymus Iamblichi.##
At a more speci!c level, the consensus view of scholars is that Anonymus Iamblichi
shows the greatest af!nity with the thought of Protagoras of Abdera—or at least with its
Platonic portrayal.#! This af!nity would appear to be relatively strong, but its arguments
are mostly circumstantial: the presence of Ionic terms in the Attic text implies that whoever
the author was, he had knowledge of Ionian dialect, and it is likely Ionian ideas about
nature were transmitted through this medium of communication.#" We cannot, however,
#! J. Adam,The Republic of Plato, second editionwith an introduction byD.A. Rees (Cambridge, 1965), Vol. 1, 68.
#" G. B. Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement (Cambridge, 1981), 148–52.
## Scholars who have considered this context in relation to Anonymus Iamblichi include M. Bonazzi, I So!sti
[So!sti] (Rome, 2010); 93, and C. H. Kahn, “The Origins of Social Contract Theory” [“Origins”], in G. B. Kerferd,
The Sophists and Their Legacy (Wiesbaden, 1981), 92–108, at 98.
#! This is the conclusion of Ciriaci, L’Anonimo, 196: “le teorie e le argomentazioni avanzate dall’ ignoto autore
risultano visibilmente in"uenzate dal pensiero di Protagora.” Cf. Bonazzi, So!sti, 93; Mari, Anonimo, 101–3;
Dillon and Gergel, Sophists, 310–1.
#" The terms identi!ed as descending from the Ionic dialect are: "6/=2<), 0$,-#=), &$.,>8//<, 5/,2%?#%&'<),
&&1-/",+*%), $$>(0,/"6<, and (+%56&<. See Ciriaci, L’Anonimo, 68–74.
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infer on the evidence of Plato alone that Protagoras in"uenced Anonymus Iamblichi, much
less that the latter was a student of Protagoras, since the exact nature of Protagoras’
thought on (a) the evolution of human nature, (b) development of the social contract,
and (c) law and justice as guarantors of this social contract, is embedded in Plato’s playful
dialogue, written sometime in the !rst half of the fourth century #!". Moreover, as Charles
Kahn notes, many of the concepts of relevance to the social contract are present even in
Athenian tragedy, reaching back as far as Aeschylus—how much of this is
Ionian philosophy channeled through Athenian eclecticism cannot be determined with
con!dence.## That said, there are further reasons to emphasize the connections between
Protagoras of Abdera and Anonymus Iamblichi, grounded in analysis of the precious
surviving snippets of the former’s writings: as we will see in section 4.1, this is especially the
case with Fragment 1 of Anonymus Iamblichi and Protagoras’ extant fragments on
education. We are better, though surely still quite poorly, served by comparison with
another Ionian philosopher, Democritus of Abdera, since a greater number of his ethical
fragments—indeed, too many (as we will see)—survive. In particular, we will note that
there are important connections between the fragments of Anonymus Iamblichi and
certain ethical fragments ascribed to Democritus (or Democrates), perhaps collected
under the title Golden Sayings, whose authenticity has been debated.#$ Finally, of all the
!gures to whom Anonymus Iamblichi has been attached, the one who has the greatest
claim to have any Pythagorean connections—and hence to suf!ce for Iamblichus’ “middle”
or “mixed” mode of exhortation—is Democritus. Hence, it is to Democritus, the eclectic
Ionian philosopher who could be claimed to have associated with Pythagoreanism (at least
for Iamblichus’ purposes), that we will turn for contextualization of the fragments of
Anonymus Iamblichi.
4. Anonymus Iamblichi’s On Excellence (!"#! "#"$#%):
A Discussion of the Fragments
4.1. Fragments 1–2: Excellence and Reputation
Now we have opportunity to turn to the eight fragments of Anonymus Iamblichi himself,
in order to see how his work might suf!ce for Iamblichus’ “mixed” or “middle” mode of
exhortation to philosophy.#% To begin with, Iamblichus has preserved large, uninterrupted
stretches from his source text, comprising what are often apparently circumscribed argu-
ments. This is clear from the summary comments that usually bookend the passages
themselves. The fragments themselves, I will argue, demonstrate an adherence to speci!c
paradigms found in Ionian philosophy, and especially in the fragments of the Abderites
Protagoras and Democritus, as against other Sophistic writers, and show especially rich
## Kahn, “Origins,” 97–105.
#$ For an accessible introduction to the problem of the Golden Sayings attributed to Democrates/Democritus,
see W. K. C. Guthrie, The History of Greek Philosophy, Volume 2: From Parmenides to Democritus (Cambridge,
1965), 489–92. On Democritus’ contributions to ethics, with a sensible analysis of the ethical fragments, see
W. Leszl, “Democritus’ Works: from their Titles to their Contents [“Works”],” in A. Brancacci and P.-M. Morel,
Democritus: Science, the Arts, and the Care of the Soul (Leiden, 2007), 11–76, at 64–76.
#% Diels (DK 89), followed by Dillon and Gergel, Sophists, Ciriaci, L’Anonimo, and Mari, Anonimo, established
seven fragments, but Diels’ seventh fragment should be broken into two fragments (see section 4.3).
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correspondences with the ethical precepts attributed to Democritus.#& The !rst fragment of
Anonymus Iamblichi’s treatise has the look of a programmatic opening, which lays out the
main topics for analysis and discussion:
Whatever one wishes to bring to perfection in the !nest terms possible – whether wisdom
(0%.'(), courage (&&5#"'(), eloquence ("62/<00'(), or excellence (&#"*3),!' either as a
whole or some part of it – one can achieve this in the following way. First, there is a need
for natural disposition (..&(,), and while this has been gifted by fortune (*6?:), the things
that are already within a human being’s power ($+’ (6*;) are these: to become eager for
!ne and good things ($+,4:$7*3) . . . */& -(//& -(! &2(4/&) and to appreciate hard work
(.,/=+%&%)), learning these things as early as possible and passing one’s life with them over
a long time. If even one of these [goods] is absent, it is not possible to bring to the height
of perfection any!! [of them]; but if one possesses all of these, whatever a human works at
(0 *, <& &0-*) cannot be outdone (&&:+1#>/7*%&).!" (Anonymus Iamblichi DK 89
Fragment 1 = Iamblichus, Exhortation to Philosophy p. 95.13–24 Pistelli)
This fragment features an introductory character, and it is likely to have come at the
beginning of a treatise or pamphlet. We cannot know the title of the work, but one possible
suggestion presents itself from what appears to be the stated topic of the work: the height of
learning is an excellence (&#"*3)!# that is whole and complete. This excellence would
appear to be comprised of, or at least function as an umbrella term for, the optimized
functions of wisdom (0%.'(), courage (&&5#"'(), and eloquence ("62/<00'().!! Hence, we
might reasonably conjecture from the introduction that the work was originally entitledOn
Excellence (!"#! &#"*')), a title well attested throughout the fourth century #!", especially
among !gures associated with the circle of Socrates.!" Therefore, I refer to the title of this
#& I should clarify that there are also some connections with intellectuals associated with the circle of Socrates,
which I will mention in footnotes.
!' As Dillon and Gergel, Sophists, 403, note, &#"*3 properly con!gured is the summation of the previous three
goods. This hypothesis seems plausible to me.
!! Adopting Kaibel’s %651& (with DK).
!" I employ the text of Diels from DK. All translations of Anonymus Iamblichi into English are my own, with
help especially from Laks and Most, Sophists, 142–63 and Dillon and Gergel, Sophists, 310–318 (although I not
infrequently depart from them).
!# Here, we can see how Iamblichus has appropriated the concept of “excellence” to his own more Platonic
concept of “virtue.”
!! Later on, in Fragment 3, Anonymus Iamblichi will also mention strength (20?6)) alongside wisdom and
eloquence—a reasonable inference is that strength there refers to courage here.
!" On Excellence/Virtue (!"#! &#"*')) is a topos in Greek literature of the period. Among the sophists, we have
evidence of Protagoras’ On Excellences (!"#! &#"*/&) (DK 80 A 1), Prodicus’ Choice of Heracles (DK 84 B 2),
described by Socrates in Xenophon’s Memorabilia (2.1.21) as being +"#! *') &#"*'); the speech ascribed to the
Mytilenian ambassadors (Thuc. 3.10) has a sub-theme +"#! *%. 5,-('%: -(! &#"*') (also cf. Pl. Cri. 53e6, for
Socrates’ speeches on the same topic); among the Socratics, we see a work!"#! &#"*'), as well as a!#%*#"+*,-=),
ascribed to Aristippus (D.L. 2.85 = SSR IV A 144); a work !"#! &#"*') 0*, %6 5,5(-*=& to Simon the Cobbler
(D.L. 2.122 = SSR VI B 87); a work !"#! &#"*') ascribed to Diogenes of Sinope (D.L. 6.80 = SSR V B 117) and
Plato’s Meno, which was subtitled !"#! &#"*'); !nally, Democritus is ascribed !"#! &&5#(2(4'() = +"#! &#"*'), a
title that works very well for the contents of the treatise of Anonymus Iamblichi. A substantial portion of the
surviving fragments, however, focus on why one needs to come to the defense of law and justice. Hence,
alternative titles could be On Law and Justice (!"#! &=$%: -(! 5,-(,%06&7)), a title which is attested for ps-
Archytas (see this volume, p. 000); On Law, ascribed to Crito (if this wasn’t confused with Plato’s eponymous
dialogue: D.L. 2.121 = SSR V B 42) and to Simon the Cobbler (D.L. 2.122 = SSR V B 87), and which is attested for
two works of Antisthenes (D.L. 6.15 = SSR V A 41), the most relevant of which is !"#! &=$%: = +"#! -(/%. -(!
5,-('%:; On Justice, which is also attested for Antisthenes (!"#! 5,-(,%06&7) -(! &&5#"'() +#%*#"+*,-#), in three
books—for the fragments related to these topics, see SSR V A 63–78).
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work as On Excellence, on the assumption that this may be the title of the work, although
we cannot be absolutely sure. In Fragment 1, excellence (&#"*3) is described, as in other
fragments of this work,!# as the activity of bringing goods (especially, but perhaps not
exclusively, wisdom, courage, and eloquence) to the height of perfection, which would
appear to require not only commitment to hard work and an appreciation of what is !ne
and good over a long period of time, factors which are under our own control, but also the
gift of a natural disposition to learning, which is conferred by fortune (*6?:).!$ Here, it is
important to emphasize the Ionian roots of Anonymus Iamblichi’s thought: natural
disposition (.60,)) and practice (-0-70,)) are prerequisites for the success guaranteed by
excellence, a Protagorean concept adapted here by Anonymus Iamblichi.!% Similarly, one
of the ethical sententiae of Democritus (DK 68 B 242), preserved by Stobaeus, also claims
that “more people become good on the basis of practice than out of their nature” (+/1%&")
$; &0-30,%) &2(4%! 2'2&%&*(, = &+# .60,%)), a sentiment that is consonant with what
Anonymus Iamblichi claims.!&
Outside of Protagoras and Democritus, the unique combination of natural disposition
(.60,)) and practice (-0-70,)) is not to be found anywhere else among early Greek
philosophers. To my knowledge, the connection between the fragments of Protagoras
himself and the arguments of Anonymus Iamblichi is unfortunately limited to this—a vivid
connection, indeed, but the only one that survives."' On the other hand, as we will see,
connections between the arguments of Anonymus Iamblichi and the corpus of
Democritus’ writings are plentiful, and very much worth examining closely, as we will
see throughout the rest of this chapter. A fragment of the Democritean corpus, preserved
both in the “Democrates” collection and by Stobaeus, extends our understanding of the
triad of goods in On Excellence by establishing a hierarchy for them:
It is orderly to submit to a law, a magistrate, a wiser man.
&=$< -(! -#?%&*, -(! 0%.<*1#7 ">-",& -=0$,%&.
(Stobaeus, Anthology 3.1.45 = Democritus DK 68 B 47)
One may note that the triad to which a person who is “orderly” should submit corresponds,
at least loosely, to the three skills that are the parts of excellence in Fragment 1 of
Anonymus Iamblichi: wisdom corresponds to the wiser man, as does courage to the
magistrate, and eloquence to the law."! For Anonymus Iamblichi, the most obvious bene!t
!# See especially Fragments 2–4.
!$ Hence, I do agree with Mari, L’Anonimo, 152–3, that wisdom, courage, and eloquence are the “parts” of
excellence.
!% DK 80 B 3 is the strongest evidence for a Protagorean connection to Anonymus Iamblichi: “Protagoras said,
‘Instruction requires nature and practice’ (.60"<) -(! &0-30"<) 5,5(0-(/'( 5")*(,), and ‘it is necessary for
[humans] to learn by starting from youth’ (&+# &"=*7*%) 51 &#;($1&%:) 5") $(&48&",&).”
!& P.-M. Morel, “Democrite et l’object de la philosophie naturelle. A propos des sens de .60,) chez Démocrite”,
in A. Brancacci and P.-M. Morel, Democritus: Science, the Arts, and the Care of the Soul (Leiden, 2007), 105–24, at
p. 119, takes this sententia to re"ect Democritus’ theory of nature.
"' Note that I am not considering the testimonia of Protagoras that derive from Plato, which do indeed show
some similarities to Anonymus Iamblichi, but which cannot, in my opinion, be taken to represent Protagoras’
thought in any unquali!ed way.
"! One might object that “courage” would more typically be associated with a soldier (instead of a magistrate),
but there is nothing preventing Democritus with stating something atypical. For example, consider the
Democritean sententia (DK 68 B 214) that states, “courageous is he who is stronger not only than enemies, but
also than pleasures. Some men rule over cities but are enslaved to women” (trans. Laks and Most, Sophists). In a
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of such a comprehensive and committed training in wisdom, courage, and eloquence is the
promise of success in one’s efforts, a success that outstrips the actions of other people,
perhaps even to their own annoyance.""
As is the case with ps-Archytas’ On Wisdom, with which Anonymus Iamblichi’s On
Excellence is paired in Iamblichus’ quotation ring-composition (discussed earlier), there is
an implicit focus on the core capacities of the human being. This may help to explain why
Anonymus Iamblichi and ps-Archytas are paired off together. Ps-Archytas had empha-
sized how human beings, uniquely among animals, had the capacity for wisdom (0%.'()
and rational speech (/=2%)): the former was identi!ed with the contemplation of the
summa genera as instantiated in the universe, and the latter with the instrument that
makes it possible to communicate such knowledge as is guaranteed by wisdom."# To be
sure, the stakes would appear to be lower for Anonymus Iamblichi: what little we hear
about wisdom and eloquence here in no way implies lofty contemplation of the things-
that-are, much less a semiotics of being; and, in fact, as we will see later on, a more likely
understanding of wisdom in Anonymus Iamblichi would link it more !rmly to art (*1?&7).
Additionally, Anonymus Iamblichi introduces a relatively unfamiliar concept to philoso-
phical and/or sophistic ethical theory: eloquence ("62/<00'(). This term usually appears in
negative contexts, referring in !fth-century #!" Greek tragedy to “slick-speaking,” under-
pinned by false pretense, but Anonymus Iamblichi intends something far more civically
bene!cial."! Moreover, it is remarkable that of the four goods listed in On Excellence—
wisdom, courage, eloquence, and excellence—it is eloquence that receives the slenderest
commentary in the extracts that follow. And indeed, as we will see in Fragment 2, some
doubt is cast on the value of the art of argumentation (*1?&7 -(*? /=2%:)) in the absence of
a suf!cient amount of time to practice and develop it. Hence, we should be hesitant to
assume that we are dealing with a strict champion of rhetoric such as Gorgias of Leontini,
whose defense of the teaching of the art of speech as against the teaching of excellence/
virtue (&#"*3) was celebrated in antiquity.""
Given the frequency with which intellectuals debated the question of whether excellence
(&#"*3) is teachable in the latter part of the !fth century #!" and beyond, it is remarkable
to see that Anonymus Iamblichi does not express his view explicitly."#He skirts around the
issue, claiming in Fragment 1 that excellence, along with wisdom, courage, and eloquence,
similar light, consider the explanation of Athena’s epithet “Thrice-born” (*#,*%21&",(), given by the Etymologicum
Orionis (DK 68 B 2): “According to Democritus, she is considered to be wisdom (.#=&70,)). For these three things
arise out of wise thinking: deliberating well, speaking without error, and doing the things which one ought to do.”
"" Another strong connection must be observed between Anonymus Iamblichi and Protagoras: it comes in a
Syriac collection of Greek sayings (DK 80 B 12). Protagoras is claimed to have said, “Effort, work, study, education,
and wisdom are the garland of glory that is woven out of the "owers of an eloquent language that is placed on the
head of those who love it. In fact, language is dif!cult, but its "owerings are rich and always new, and those who
look, those who applaud, and those who teach are happy, and their pupils make progress and fools are annoyed –
or perhaps they are not even annoyed, because they are not intelligent enough” (trans. Laks and Most, from
Hugonnard-Roche’s French).
"# ps-Archytas, OnWisdom Fragments 2 (pp. 44.5–15 Thesleff = Iambl. Protr. 4, pp. 18.23–19.11 Pistelli) and 3
(p. 44.18–20 Thesleff = Iambl. Protr. 4, p. 20.16–19 Pistelli). See Horky, “Ps-Archytas,” 27–31.
"! It is negatively tinged in Aristoph. Nub. 445; also see Euripides Fragments 56 and 206 Nauck. See Ciriaci,
L’Anonimo, 78 n. 5 and Mari, Anonimo, 154–5.
"" Most notably by Meno in Plato’s Meno (95c1–4 = DK 82 A 21).
"# Even within the Socratic circle, there was a debate about whether &#"*3was teachable. Antisthenes thought it
was (D.L. 6.10–1 = SSR V A 134), and Simon the Cobbler that it wasn’t (D.L. 2.122 = SSR VI B 87).
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can be “learned” ($(&48&%&() through continuous application and commitment, but with
no stipulation of the requirement of a good teacher; this fact alone should make us wary of
ascribing authorship to a Sophist such as Hippias or Prodicus."$ In Fragment 2, the author
expands on this notion, while at the same time focusing especially on the ends of this
activity, which are a good reputation and universal approval:
From the moment when one wishes to acquire a good reputation among human beings,
and to show himself to have the sorts of qualities he has, he must straightaway begin while
young and apply himself to it consistently, and not in different ways at different times. For
when each of these [goods] has persisted, having had a !rm beginning and growing to
perfection, he acquires a !rm reputation and fame (/($>8&", >1>(,%& *,& 5=;(& -(! *#
-/1%)) for the following reasons: because by now he is un"inchingly trusted, and human
envy (.4=&%)) does not stick to him – [envy], on account of which humans neither extol
nor speak in praise of things, but instead falsify them, criticizing them unjustly. For it is no
pleasure for humans to assign honor to someone else (for they suppose that they
themselves are being deprived of something); but if they are bested by necessity itself
and induced little by little over a long time, they become praisers, even if unwillingly. At
the same time, if someone indeed shows himself to [really] have the sorts of qualities he
has – or [if] he is setting a trap and hunting after reputation by means of deceit ($+! &+8*:)
and, by leading [other] humans on, embellishes (-(//<+'@"*(,) the very things he has
achieved – they are not in doubt about this (%6- &$.,>8//%:0,&)."% But if excellence is
worked at (&0-74")0( 8 &#"*3) in the way I just mentioned, it engenders trust for itself,
and universal approval ("+-/",(). For humans, once they have been conquered in strength
(@(/<-=*") . . . A57 -(*? *# 20?:#=&), no longer have the capacity to resort to envy, nor do
they still believe that they are being deceived.
What is more, whenever an extended period of time accompanies each achievement
and activity, that gives strength to what one has been working at (-#(*6&", *# &0-%6$"&%&),
whereas a short amount of time is not able to accomplish this. And, in the case of art
(*1?&7), if someone were to acquire and learn the art of argumentation (-(*? /=2%:)),"& he
would become [a practitioner] not inferior to his teacher in a short amount of time; but, in
the case of excellence (&#"*3),#' it would not be possible for someone who begins late or
[works at it] for a short amount of time to bring to perfection that excellence which
accrues from many achievements. Rather, it is necessary for him to be reared along with it
[sc. excellence],#! and to grow up with it, avoiding ignoble arguments and habits, and
instead practicing and working hard [at it] over a long time, and with much care. At the
same time, a disadvantage of this sort also attends a good reputation gained in a short
"$ A teacher is mentioned in Fragment 2, but rather hypothetically, and only in the service of showing that if
someone does indeed go to a teacher for learning the goods, he will only learn them properly if he does so with
long-term commitment.
"% Literally, they “do not contest it.” The language is forensic.
"& Understanding, with Dillon and Gergel, Sophists, /=2%, in the plural as “arguments” or “argumentation,”
rather than mere speech or speeches.
#' The emphatic !rst positioning for these terms here indicates a fundamental contrast.
#! It is unclear whether this refers to “the art of argumentation” or “excellence,” but local proximity would
indicate the latter. Indeed, if, as I believe, “the art of argumentation” is but a part of “excellence” as a whole, the
latter would elegantly imply the former.
274 .-+,,+. *+/%"' -&01'
OUP UNCORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FIRST PROOF, 25/2/2020, SPi
Comp. by: SatchitananthaSivam Stage : Proof ChapterID: 0004760416 Date:25/2/20 Time:10:49:55
Filepath:D:/BgPr/OUP_CAP/IN/Process1/0004760416.3d
Dictionary : NOAD_USDictionary 275
amount of time: those who suddenly, or in a short amount of time, become wealthy, or
wise, or good, or courageous, are not received with pleasure by human beings.
(Anonymus Iamblichi DK 89 Fragment 2 = Iamblichus, Exhortation to Philosophy
pp. 96.1–97.8 Pistelli)
In Fragment 2, Anonymus Iamblichi sets out to explain why excellence (&#"*3), when it
has been properly worked at (&0-74")0(), engenders trust, which is the basis for a truly
positive reputation in society. Hence, we see an expanded discussion of the importance
of repeated practice (-0-70,)) for gradually achieving excellence.#" Anonymus Iamblichi
presents an acute analysis of the problem of envy (.4=&%)), as it attaches itself to
individuals who seek a good reputation within a social community. For Anonymus
Iamblichi, envy is a most destructive social emotion, since it compels people to distrust
a good man, and it threatens to ruin the project of pursuing a positive reputation in
society.## It goes so far as to make people tell falsehoods about a good person.#! We
might here recall Hesiod’s moralizing tale of the Iron Age (Works and Days ll. 190–6), in
which there is “no grace for the oath-keeper, the just, the good” (%651 *,) "6=#-%:
?8#,) . . . %651 5,-('%: %65’ &2(4%.), and all men are attended by “Envy, malice-tongued,
revelling in evil” (A'/%) . . . 5:0-1/(5%) -(-=?(#*%)). A more proximate comparison both
in time and sense, however, is with a sententia attributed to Democritus, which goes so
far as to assert that envy is the root cause of civil strife:
If each man did not do harm to another, then the laws wouldn’t prevent each man from
living under his own authority. For envy furnishes an origin of strife.
%6- <& $-9/:%& %B &=$%, @'& C-(0*%& -(*’ 25'7& $;%:0'7&, "2 $, C*"#%) C*"#%& $/:$('&"*%.
.4=&%) 2?# 0*80,%) &#?,& &+"#28@"*(,.
(Stobaeus, Anthology 3.38.53 = Democritus DK 68 B 245)
Democritus’ ethical thought, as expressed in the sententiae preserved by Stobaeus, focuses
on the social effects of individual human emotions.#" Envy, in particular, supplies the
reason why laws prescribe a social contract, according to which people are not allowed to
live as they wish, without thought of their fellow man. For envy is taken to be the root cause
of humans harming one another. Another sententia attributed to Democritus takes this
proposition further, claiming of those who cultivate desire for rivalry that:
All love for contention is thoughtless: for, if one focuses on what is harmful for his enemy,
he misses what is advantageous for himself.
#" This appeal to practice is shared by several Socratics, including Aristippus (Gnom. Vat. 743 n. 34 = SSR IV
A 124) and Antisthenes (Stob. Flor. 2.31.68 = SSR V A 163), although they appeal to 2:$&80,%& rather than
-0-70,).
## Compare the sententia of Democritus (attributed to Democrates at DK 68 B 88): “He who envies harms
himself as if he were [his own] enemy.”
#! Compare, again, the Democritean sententia, attributed to Democrates (DK 68 B 63), concerning the ethical
imperative of praising those who do well, as against those who speak well of cheats: “It is a !ne thing to speak well
of good actions; for to do so of base actions is the act of a counterfeit and a cheat” ("6/%21",& $+! -(/%)) D#2$(0,
-(/=&B *# 2?# $+! ./(6#%,0, -'>57/%& -(! &+(*"/&%) D#2%&).
#" See J. Warren, “Democritus on Social and Psychological Harm,” in A. Brancacci and P.-M. Morel,
Democritus: Science, the Arts, and the Care of the Soul (Leiden, 2007), 87–104, at 94.
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C,/%&",-'7 +E0( &&=7*%)B *# 2?# -(*? *%. 5:0$"&1%) >/(>"##& 4"<#".0( *# >5,%& 0:$.1#%&
%6 >/1+",.
(Stobaeus, Anthology 3.20.62 = Democritus DK 68 B 237)
The Democritean sentiment here extends what Anonymus Iamblichi had said about envy:
the desire for rivalry (.,/%&",-'7) is not simply bad for the community, or one’s city-state;##
it’s also bad for one’s self, because one who concentrates his attention on what can be used
to harm another will neglect to see what advantages can arise out of collaboration with that
person. This is reason to be called a “thoughtless” (&&=7*%)) person.#$ The criticism of love
for rivalry in the sententiae of Democritus is indicative of other connections to On
Excellence: as we will see with Fragment 4 in section 4.2, the appeal to “love of-” (.,/%-)
abstractions is pervasive throughout the fragments of Anonymus Iamblichi, and once
again con!rms the important connections between Democritus’ ethical fragments and the
thought and compositional style of Anonymus Iamblichi.
Correspondences such as these, which concern what I am calling “social emotions,”
return our analysis to the issue of Iamblichus’ attribution of a “middle” or “mixed” style of
exhortation to Anonymus Iamblichi’s work. Like ps-Archytas, whose OnWisdom is paired
with Anonymus Iamblichi’s On Excellence in the quotation ring-composition, Democritus
is a strong candidate for someone who approximates Pythagoreanism “strictly speaking”
(-&*,-#:)), i.e., an “exoteric” or “mathematical” Pythagorean. Indeed, I would argue, there
is good reason to conjecture that Iamblichus believed the work On Excellence to be
authored by Democritus himself, which is why he included it in his Exhortation and paired
it with On Wisdom, a work he thought to be by Archytas of Tarentum. It is clear that the
Neo-Pythagorean Thrasyllus, who edited both Democritus’ and Plato’s corpora in the !rst
century #!", believed Democritus to have become an “emulator of the Pythagoreans”
(@7/<*,) 2"2%&1&(, */& !:4(2%#,-/&),#% and Democritus’ own late !fth-century #!"
contemporary, the historian of music Glaucus of Rhegium, claimed that Democritus
“heard” (&-%.0(,), i.e., was a student of, one of the Pythagoreans (*/& !:4(2%#,-/&
*,&%)).#& Other !gures within the Pythagorean-Platonist historical tradition, including
the shadowy Apollodorus of Cyzicus and Iamblichus’ teacher Porphyry, con!rmed and
expanded this supposition.$' Thrasyllus is also believed by most scholars to have placed
Democritus’ work Pythagoras, in which he found Democritus recalling Pythagoras for the
wonder he instilled (-(! (6*%. !:4(2=#%: $1$&7*(,, 4(:$8@<& (6*=& $& *; "$<&6$7
0:22#8$$(*,), at the head of the tetralogy of his work$!—just like Iamblichus’ On the
## As is the case in DK 68 B 252, where the Democritean sententia argues that one should take greatest
consideration for the affairs of the city-state by “not loving contention, which is contrary to what is fair, nor
conferring upon oneself a strength that is contrary to what is useful for the whole” ($3*" .,/%&",-1%&*( +(#? *#
$+,",-1) $3*" 20?6& @(:*; +"#,*,41$"&%& +(#? *# ?#70*#& *# *%. ;:&%.).
#$ The vice of being “thoughtless” appears frequently in the Democritean sententiae (DK 68 B 197, B 199–202,
B 204–6).
#% The term @7/<*') refers elsewhere in Iamblichus’ works to illegitimate Pythagoreans or “Pythagorists” (e.g.,
Iambl. VP 80, p. 46.13–17 Deubner-Klein). See Horky, Plato, 127–8 with n. 6.
#& D.L. 9.38 = DK 68 A 1 = Thrasyllus Testimonia 18b Tarrant = Glaucon of Rhegium Frag. 5 Lanata.
$' The otherwise unknown Apollodorus of Cyzicus (DK 74) is cited by Diogenes Laertius (9.38) as claiming
that Democritus was a companion (0:22"2%&1&(,) of Philolaus, and by Pliny (NH 24.167) as a follower (adsectator)
of Democritus. Porphyry, Iamblichus’ teacher, quotes Duris of Samos himself as saying that a son of Pythagoras,
Arimnestus, was Democritus’ teacher (VP 3 = DK 14 A6 = BNJ 76 F 23).
$! D.L. 9.38 = DK 68 A 1 = Thrasyllus Testimonia 18b Tarrant.
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Pythagorean Life, the biographical work which was placed !rst in the Compendium of
Pythagorean Doctrines, and Pythagoras’ Golden Verses, which appeared at the beginning of
his Exhortation to Philosophy.$"Whether or not it is historically true that Democritus was
himself a Pythagorean—I suspend judgment on this question for now—the association of
Democritus with Pythagoreanism by Thrasyllus and others would help to explain why
Anonymus Iamblichi, whose text shows many remarkable connections to the ethical
fragments of Democritus, is paired off with Archytas in Iamblichus’ Exhortation: it is
not implausible that Iamblichus would have believed (a) that the author of On Excellence
was Democritus, and (b) that Democritus’ philosophical views, as re"ected in the work On
Excellence, suf!ciently re"ected for Iamblichus’ purposes the “mixed” or “middle”mode of
exhortation to philosophy.$#Wemight here wish to recall that the Democritean sententiae,
some of which survive under the title Golden Sayings (2&/$(, ?#:0()),$! were preserved
by Stobaeus, who obtained his library substantially from Iamblichus himself.$" These
sententiae, as evidenced in this section, have an aphoristic quality, appearing as short,
self-contained units that promise ethical wisdom—not unlike the symbola/acusmata of
Pythagoras himself.
4.2. Fragments 3–5: Excellence, Human Psychology, and Society
Assuming that someone has the natural ability and commitment to attaining excellence as
it was described earlier, i.e., as the perfected capacity to deploy wisdom, courage, and
eloquence, Anonymus Iamblichi now turns to the problem of the application of these
goods in one’s life. As we mentioned previously, the defense of law and justice would
appear to be a commonplace exercise in late !fth-century #!" Greece, with Glaucon
referring to a multitude of !gures who sought to defend law and justice by appeal to a
social contract among humans. Moreover, we might note here that a text entitled On Law
and Justice, attributed to the mathematical Pythagorean Archytas of Tarentum, survives in
several fragments in Stobaeus’ collection, which was surely constructed on the basis of
Iamblichus’ own library.$# Anonymus Iamblichi would also appear to fall into this group of
defenders of law and justice. From Fragment 3, when law and justice !rst appear in the
treatise, until the very end of the surviving fragments, there is a sustained defense of lawful
and just social application of the goods that make up excellence. This application is
contrasted against the unlawful and unjust application of these goods, which constitutes
$" Generally, I agree with Leszl’s (“Works,” 21–23) judicious treatment of the evidence concerning Democritus
and Pythagoreanism.
$# It is true that Democritus is not listed in the catalogue of Pythagoreans found at the end of his On the
PythagoreanWay of Life (VP 267). But, as Leszl (“Works,” 23) notes, the evidence itself within Iamblichus’ corpus
of atomists being Pythagorean is inconsistent. Iamblichus does not mention Leucippus in the catalogue, but does
include him at VP 103 in the list of the second-generation mathematical Pythagoreans ($(47*"60(&*") *;
!:4(2=#F +#"0>6*: &1%,, as contrasted to the !rst-generation +(/(,=*(*%, -(! &:*; 0:2?#%&'0(&*"))—a list
that includes Philolaus, Eurytus, Archytus, Empedocles, and Hippasus, who are assuredly mathematical/exoteric
Pythagoreans. Iamblichus’ teacher Porphyry quotes Duris of Samos as saying that a son of Pythagoras,
Arimnestus, was Democritus’ teacher (VP 3 = DK 14 A6).
$! According to Mss. B and C of the “Democrates” collection.
$" See C. Macris, “Jamblique et la littérature pseudo-pythagoricienne”, in S. C. Mimouni, Apocryphité
(Turnhout, 2002), 77–129, at 88–106.
$# See chapter 20 of this volume.
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the opposite of excellence, baseness (-(-'(). Anonymus Iamblichi marks this transition at
the beginning of Fragment 3:
Whenever someone desiring one of these [!ne and good things] – either eloquence,
wisdom, or strength – through hard work obtains and possesses it to perfection, he should
employ it for good and lawful [ends] ("2) &2(4? -(! &=$,$( -(*(?#'04(, 5")); but if anyone
will use the good that is in his possession for unjust and unlawful [ends] ("2) -5,-8 *" -(!
-&%$(), this sort of thing is the basest of all (+8&*<& -8-,0*%&),$$ and it would be better if
this were absent to him than present to him. And just as someone who possesses one of
these becomes perfectly good (&2(4#) *"/1<)) when he employs (-(*(?#/$"&%)) them$%
to good [ends], so too in turn he who uses [them] to ignoble [ends] becomes perfectly and
wholly base (+82-(-%) *"/1<)).$&
In the case of the human who aspires to the whole of excellence (*#& . . . &#"*')
5#"2=$"&%& *') 0:$+807)), we must examine on the basis of what speech or achievement
($- *'&%) /=2%: = D#2%:) he might become as good as possible. This sort of human [sc. one
who is as good as possible] would be the one who is bene!cial (G.1/,$%)) to as many
people as possible. Indeed, if someone confers bene!t upon his neighbors by giving
money,%' he will be forced to be base (&&(2-(0430"*(, -(-#) "3&(,) when he returns%! to
collect the money; and then, he could not accumulate resources in such abundance that he
would not end up [himself] being in need, owing to his grants and donations. And again,
this is a second drawback that follows upon the accumulation of money, if one goes from
wealthy to poor, or from having [much] to having nothing. And furthermore, if he were to
make donations, how could he ensure that his capacity to gift should never fail?%" In sum,
how could someone be a bene!ciary of humans – not by distributing money, but in some
other way – and do these things not with baseness (-(-'F), but with excellence (&#"**)?
This will be so in the following way: if he acts in support of laws and justice ("2 *%)) &=$%,)
*" -(! *; 5,-('7 $+,-%:#%'7). For this is what establishes and binds together cities and
human beings (*%.*% 2?# *8) *" +=/",) -(! *%H) &&4#9+%:) *# 0:&%,-'@%& -(! *# 0:&1?%&).
(Anonymus Iamblichi DK 89 Fragment 3 = Iamblichus, Exhortation to Philosophy
pp. 97.16–98.11 Pistelli)
Having argued previously that one should seek to attain excellence in wisdom, courage,
and eloquence, in order to gain universal appeal among people, Anonymus Iamblichi shifts
the argument to the proper application of these skills. In particular, we note that the
application of these skills to unlawful and unjust ends is the worst thing of all, even worse
$$ I translate -(-=) and other correlated words with “base,” but it could also be translated “bad,” “evil,” or
“wicked.” Its abstract nominalization “baseness” (-(-'() is clearly contrasted in Fragment 3 with “excellence”
(&#"*3).
$% The text unmistakably has the plural (6*%)), although both Laks and Most, Sophists, and Dillon and Gergel,
Sophists, have a singular “it.”
$& Retaining Mss. *"/1<), contra Diels.
%' Italics mine, since the argument that follows seeks to refute those who believe that one is bene!cial to the
greatest number of people through giving money.
%! I take this to be the force of +8/,& (% with 0://12<&, rather than “he will be obliged to be wicked again in
turn,” as Laks and Most, Sophists, have it. There is no suggestion that the person who gives money as a bene!t to
his neighbor is, by virtue of this act, -(-=).
%" Accepting the transposition of these lines here, from below, where they appear in the manuscripts after the
next sentence, as suggested by Laks and Most, Sophists, 148 n. 1.
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than if one had never attained pro!ciency in these skills in the !rst place. As we will see in
Fragments 6 and 8, this particular worry on the part of Anonymus Iamblichi relates to
what I will call the “Superman”—a human being perfected in body and soul, and with
superhuman abilities, who has the potential to become either a great leader, or a terrible
tyrant. Anonymus Iamblichi establishes a strong polarity: the person who achieves
pro!ciency in these skills, and hence “excellence,” can become completely good if and
only if he employs these skills to good purposes, so too the person who employs them
to base purposes achieves complete baseness. Key here is the notion that application
(-(*(?#'04(,; -(*(?#/$"&%)) of skills is a necessary condition for achieving a state of
perfection—either for perfect excellence or for perfect baseness.
Anonymus Iamblichi expands this proposition further by de!ning exactly which way
one is to achieve perfect excellence. The answer—quite surprising and unique for an
ancient intellectual—is through conferring bene!t on the greatest number of people. This
would indicate that Anonymus Iamblichi seeks to promote a vision of an ideal leader
who operates with a view to what is best for the d!mos, i.e., a democratic leader, after the
fashion of Pericles of Athens.%# Anonymus Iamblichi suspects that after registering this
assertion, his reader will assume that the bene!t to be conferred is the distribution of
money and gifts, and Anonymus Iamblichi sets out immediately to show that this
assumption is unsound. The problem with giving money to others is that it will
inevitably (&&(2-(0430"*(,) lead to “baseness” (-(-'(; -(-=))—either one will express
base intentions if he returns to collect the money loaned, or he himself will run out of
money and become the poor person he sought to help; after all, money doesn’t grow on
trees.%! Alternatively, so Anonymus Iamblichi argues, it is by supporting law and justice,
the guarantors of civic success, that one properly confers bene!t on the greatest number
of people, both as citizens, and as private individuals.%" Euergetism of the type advanced
by Anonymus Iamblichi, which consists in the defense of law and justice at all costs, is a
necessary condition for becoming a “good” person, once one has attained pro!ciency in
the arts of excellence. This is because, according to Anonymus Iamblichi, law and justice
are what causes bonds to develop among households, i.e., what produces synoecism, and
what sustains those bonds over time—the most explicit example of Anonymus
Iamblichi’s commitment to a principle of the social contract.
For the moment, however, Anonymus Iamblichi sets aside the issue of law and justice; it
will return soon, in Fragment 6. Fragment 4 follows closely upon the former and represents
an extended analysis of human emotions:
At any rate, every man should be exceedingly self-controlled ($2-#(*10*(*%& . . .
5,(."#=&*<)). He would be that sort of man to the greatest extent, if he were to prevail
%# It is possible, I believe, to overstate the connection between Periclean democracy and Anonymus Iamblichi,
but we should recall Pericles’ assertion (Thuc. 2.37.1) that in democratic Athens the “conduct [of political affairs]
is not with an eye to the few, but to the many” ($, $) 5/'2%:) &//’ $; +/"'%&() %2-")&).
%! Similarly, Antisthenes is represented by Xenophon (Symp. 4.2–5 = SSR V A 83) as refuting Callias’ claim that
all it takes to make people more just is to give them money. Antisthenes shows that this euergetic behavior makes
Callias’ bene!ciaries treat him even worse than they had before. To be sure, this is not the same point that
Anonymus Iamblichi is making.
%" Ciriaci (L’Anonimo, 128–33) considers the best comparison here to be to Protagoras, whom he assumes to be
the intellectual with the closest ties to Periclean democracy. But all the evidence he brings to bear is circumstantial.
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over (-#"'00<&)%# money, which corrupts all men when they are presented with it, and if
he were to be unsparing with his life (*') D:?') &.",53))%$ in the pursuit of just things and
striving for excellence; for most people lack self-control in these two matters. And they
suffer this condition for the following reason: they love their lives (.,/%D:?%.0,), because
one’s life (8 D:?3) is one’s property (8 @<3).%%Hence, they cherish it and are desirous for it
because of their affection for their property and their familiarity with [the property] that
contributed to their upbringing. And they love money (.,/%?#7$(*%.0,) for the following
reasons, which cause them fear: what are these? Diseases, old age, sudden losses – I don’t
mean losses that arise out of law-suits%& (for one can take precautions against these and
protect oneself from them), but losses of these sorts: !res, deaths of household members or
livestock, and other misfortunes, some of which pertain to their bodies, others their lives,
and others their money. So then, it is because of all these things – to have recourse to
money in their eventuality – that every man aspires to wealth. Some other [factors], no less
than the aforementioned, also drive humans to moneymaking: competitions for honor ((B
.,/%*,$'(,), rivalries (%B @'/%,), and political contests ((B 5:&(0*")(,), on account of which
they consider money of high value, because it contributes to such [factors]. But whoever is
truly a good man hunts after reputation by means of no other sort of gilded ornamentation
(-=0$%) +"#,-"'$"&%)) than his own excellence. (Anonymus Iamblichi DK 89 Fragment 4
= Iamblichus, Exhortation to Philosophy pp. 98.17–99.15 Pistelli)
In attempting to censure further the desire for wealth, Anonymus Iamblichi constructs an
intricate argument about human emotions. He praises the self-control that the man of
excellence embodies in the face of various sorts of harmful desires that are rooted in the
human condition.&' Ultimately, the problem with humans is that their desire for money
arises out of their desire for their own life (.,/%D:?'(). Both nature and fortune conspire to
threaten human lives: nature causes us to grow old and to become diseased, whereas bad
fortune causes harm—generally in the form of injury to one’s household property.
Consequently, humans become afraid for their life (D:?3), which is described as a sort
of property or means for survival (@<3), probably in a Homeric sense.&! This claim
anticipates Locke’s assertion that one’s life is in fact one’s property (Two Treatises of
Government 2.87), along with liberty and possessions. To be sure, Anonymus Iamblichi is
not seeking to establish the positive rights of individual human beings; rather, he makes an
observation about the way people treat their lives in order to explain human desire for
wealth and possessions. But wealth and possessions cannot satisfy the criterion of
%# Literally, “be stronger than/superior to.” The phrase recurs in Pericles’ funeral oration (Thuc. 2.60.5), where
it is an epexegesis of the term .,/=+%/,) (“lover of one’s own city”).
%$ As noted by Dillon and Gergel (Sophists, 404), the term D:?3 here adopts the archaic Greek meaning of “life-
force.”
%% The text is corrupt, but I adopt Pistelli’s conjecture of *%6*%,) 8 @<3 $0*,& 8 D:?3 and understand @<3 in the
Homeric sense of “life-property” (cf. LSJ 1a). A comprehensive analysis of this troublesome phrase, including its
history, is presented by Mari, Anonimo, 210–15.
%& Literally, “laws” ($- */& &=$<&), but the explanation that follows would imply that lawsuits are speci!cally
intended here, and not laws in general (cf. Dillon and Gergel, Sophists, 314).
&' In particular, $2-#8*",( was praised by certain Socratics, e.g., Xenophon (Mem. 1.5.1–6) and Antiphon (D.
L. 2.74–5 = SSR IV A 96 and Stob. Flor. 3.17.17 = V A 98).
&! Cf. Hom. Od. 14.96, 14.208, 16.429.
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goodness: they are but “gilded ornamentation” (-=0$%) +"#,-"'$"&%)) that cannot
substitute for the true excellence (&#"*3) that produces a good reputation in society.&"
In the short fragment that follows, Anonymus Iamblichi ampli!es his analysis of the
human condition, love for one’s life, and supplies a solution to the problem of death:
If it were to be a feature of the human condition that, unless death occurs at the hands of
another, one would be ageless and immortal for the rest of time, then there would be a
great deal of sympathy for a human who cherishes his life; but since old age, which is
worse for humans, is a feature of the human condition for [one whose] life is extended,
and not immortality, then it is truly a mark both of great ignorance and of habituation to
ignoble arguments and desires to preserve this [sc. one’s life] with scorn, and not to leave
behind something immortal in its place, a renown ("6/%2'() that is eternal (&1&(%&) and
always thriving (&"! @/07), instead of one that is mortal. (Anonymus Iamblichi DK 89
Fragment 5 = Iamblichus, Exhortation to Philosophy pp. 99.19–28 Pistelli)
Anonymus Iamblichi appeals to a traditional Greek notion of the immortality of renown as
contrasted with mortal goods, a commonplace from Homer forward (e.g., Iliad 9.410–16;
Heraclitus DK 22 B 29); as Jacqueline de Romilly noticed, the formulation used by
Anonymus Iamblichi, "6/%2'(, is relatively rare in classical Greek, but recurs in
Thucydides, notably in Pericles’ Funeral Oration (2.42.1).&# In the same vein, Anonymus
Iamblichi appears to take a page from Gorgias’ Funeral Oration (DK 82 B 6), where
the sophist exclaims that the longing (" +=4%)) that people feel for deceased Athenian
soldiers “has not died with them, but it lives on, immortal, in bodies not incorporeal”
(%6 0:&(+14(&"&, &//’ &48&(*%) $& %6- &0<$8*%,) 09$(0, @',), i.e., in words.&! From this
perspective, it is clear that Anonymus Iamblichi appropriated material from many areas of
popular Greek ethical discourse, including the area that was of paramount importance to
Athenians: the celebration of the war dead at the annual Funeral Oration.&"
4.3. Fragments 6–8: Law, Justice, and the “Superman”
Fragment 6 marks a transition in the argument ofOn Excellence in at least three ways. First,
it features the !nal occurrence of excellence (&#"*3) in the work, thus completing discus-
sion of its application, which had been threaded through Fragments 1–5 (although, to be
sure, Anonymus Iamblichi continues to discuss the other goods that make up excellence).
Second, it stages a natural transition to the defense of law and justice, which had been
mentioned in Fragment 3, but remained dormant while Anonymus Iamblichi went
&" Compare the Socratic Aristippus’ claim that cosmetics (-%0$%:$1&7 *; +#%09+7) cannot hide the unsha-
peliness (&$%#.'() of a woman’s soul (Antoninus Melissa 2.34.43 = SSR IV A 139).
&# J. de Romilly, “Sur un écrit anonyme ancient et ses rapports avec Thucydide” [“Thucydide”], Journal des
Savants 1 (1980), 11–35, at 28–9.
&! Accepting the text $& %6- &0<$8*%,), attested in Mon. Par. 2916 and 2918. That words are corporeal
according to Gorgias is made clear at the Encomium of Helen 8 (DK 82 B 11), on which see P. S. Horky, “The
Imprint of the Soul: Psychosomatic Affection in Plato, Gorgias, and the ‘Orphic’ Gold Tablets,” Mouseion III.6
(2006), 371–86, at 376–7.
&" Generally, on the relations between Anonymus Iamblichi and Pericles’ Funeral Oration, see De Romilly,
“Thucydide.”
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through an explanation of human emotions and their effects upon society in the
subsequent fragments. And !nally, the defense of law and justice, which a priori support
social cohesion and personal integrity (so the end of Fragment 3), provides the author with
the opportunity to extol respect for law ("6&%$'() and to censure the lack thereof (&&%$'().
The division between the !rst and second parts of the work is at !rst glance striking, and
might be thought to indicate a new treatise; but, as I will show, the Fragments 6–8 both
subtly build upon previous arguments found in Fragments 1–5, and develop more com-
prehensive accounts of topics that were passed over in brief, including law and justice,
personal emotions, lawsuits, and the problem of fortune.
Anonymus Iamblichi provides his !nal thoughts on excellence (&#"*3) in the negative,
by arguing against those who would believe that the proper object of one’s desires should
be greed, or that power founded upon greed ought to be considered a kind of excellence:
One should not aspire to greed (%6- $+! +/"%&";'(& "#$E& 5")), nor believe that power
(-#8*%)) is an excellence (&#"*3) founded upon greed, whereas obedience to the laws (*/&
&=$<& (+(-%6",&) is cowardice; for this very notion is the most ignoble (+%&7#%*8*7), and
everything opposed to what is good arises out of it, viz. baseness and harm. For if humans
have been born naturally ($.60(&) incapable of surviving&# alone (&56&(*%, -(4’ C&( @'&),
formed associations with one another under the compulsion of necessity, and discovered
all the means of survival and mechanisms (*"?&3$(*() for achieving it; and if it was not
possible to exist with one another and to pass their lives in a state of lack of respect of law
(&&%$'F)&$ (for their losses would be greater in this state than if they were to be alone) – by
reason of these necessities, then, law and justice rule over human beings (*#& *" &=$%& -(!
*# 5'-(,%& $$>(0,/"6",& *%)) &&4#9+%,)) and can in no way be displaced. For these [sc. law
and justice] are strongly bound ($&5"5104(,) in [us] by nature (.60",). Indeed, if someone
were to be born in possession of such a nature as this, invulnerable in his "esh (-*#<*%)
*#& ?#/*(), immune to disease and affections (-&%0=) *" -(! &+(43)), of supernatural
ability ((+"#.:3)), adamantine (&5($8&*,&%)) in body and life, one might suppose that
power founded upon greed would suf!ce for someone of this sort (for someone like this
would have the capacity of going unpunished if he were to refuse to submit to the law);
and yet his supposition would be incorrect. For even if there could be someone like this,
which could never happen, it would only be by allying himself with the laws and justice,
fortifying them, and making use of his strength for their sake, and for the sake of what
supports them, that someone like this could ensure his safety; otherwise, he would not last.
For all humans would resolve to stand opposed to someone of this nature because of their
respect for law ("6&%$'(), and the multitude (*# +/'4%)) would prevail over and overcome
a man of this sort, either through skill or might (*1?&: = 5:&8$",). Accordingly, it is
evident that true power ((6*# *# -#8*%)), which is power properly understood, is
preserved by law and justice. (Anonymus Iamblichi DK 89 Fragment 6 = Iamblichus,
Exhortation to Philosophy pp. 100.5–101.6 Pistelli)
&# As elsewhere in this text, @'& refers both to survival and to "ourishing.
&$ I translate &&%$'( as “lack of respect for law,” since the term as it is used by Anonymus Iamblichi appears to
involve not only the condition of acting without law (i.e., lawlessness), but also the psychological state of not
affording respect to the law.
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Here, with the introduction of the principle of +/"%&";'( (greed in relation to money or
possessions, but more generally the term means “having-more-than-one’s-share”) presents
Anonymus Iamblichi with an opportunity to re"ect upon the idea of power (-#8*%)). In
particular, he addresses an assertion that was in the air, namely that power grounded in
greed (+/"%&";'() was itself something to be desired, or even a type of excellence, and its
correlative, that obeying the laws was a sign of cowardice, i.e., the opposite of courage. The
most famous defense of +/"%&";'( in the context of the production of Anonymus
Iamblichi’s On Excellence is of course put into the mouth of Callicles, in Plato’s Gorgias:
I believe that the people who institute our laws are the weak and the many. They do this,
and so they assign praise and blame with themselves and their own advantage in mind.
They’re afraid of the more powerful among men, the ones who are capable of having a
greater share (5:&(*%! +/1%& D?",&), and so they say that getting more than one’s share is
“shameful” ((20?#=&) and “unjust” (-5,-%&), and that doing what’s unjust is trying to get
more than one’s share (*# &5,-")& . . . *# +/"=& */& -//<& @7*")& D?",&). They do this so that
those people won’t get a greater share than they. (Pl. Grg. 483b4–c5; trans. Zeyl)
Callicles criticizes democracy and its champions for appealing to justice and shame in
order to maximize their own advantage: their so-called defense of justice and shame is a
sham, a thinly veiled excuse for self-aggrandizement.&% The obvious reference here would
be to Protagoras’ Great Speech in Plato’s own Protagoras (322d3–6), where, in particular,
shame ((25/)) and justice (5'-7) are gifted to all human beings by Zeus in order to prevent
the human race from being destroyed. But we should also infer that Callicles’ arguments
were leveled, in particular, against pro-democratic political theorists (such as Anonymus
Iamblichi, or Archytas of Tarentum) who maintained that +/"%&";'( endangered the city-
state and its citizens.&& For his part, Anonymus Iamblichi tests the sort of Calliclean
hypothesis, that +/"%&";'( is a kind of excellence to which everyone should strive, by
appeal to a thought experiment involving the most powerful human ever created: the
Superman. This !gure is impassable in body, immune from illness, made of the strongest
metal on earth; his nature is beyond that of other mortals, and yet this nature cannot
overcome the inborn bonds of law and justice.!'' The local reference in late !fth-century
#!" culture might be thought to be Heracles, especially the Heracles of Prodicus’ Choice of
Heracles (DK 84 B 2),!'! although it is notable that Anonymus Iamblichi does not refer to
his own Superman as a “hero,” “demigod,” or “god”: such a !gure could easily refuse to
submit to the law with impunity. The Superman would reappear throughout the history of
philosophy and literature, and often in political contexts. In his Pharsalia, the Roman poet
Lucan (60s !") writes of Julius Caesar as “piercing and unstoppable,” a diabolical super-
human who “overthrows anything that stands in the way of his pursuit of the
&% On Callicles and democracy, see R. Kamtekar, “The Profession of Friendship: Callicles, Democratic Politics,
and Rhetorical Education in Plato’s Gorgias,” Ancient Philosophy 25 (2005), 319–39.
&& See Archytas of Tarentum, Fragment 3 Huffman, and ps-Archytas, On Law and Justice Fragment 3
(pp. 33.30–34.14 Thesleff), which are discussed elsewhere in this volume (see p.000).
!'' Hence, Anonymus Iamblichi deals with the traditional late !fth-century #!" problem of the dichotomy
between law (&=$%)) and nature (.60,)) by combining them. On this aspect of the text and its relations to
Protagoras’ thought as presented in Plato’s eponymous dialogue, see Ciriaci, L’Anonimo, 156–161.
!'! There are other problems here: Heracles is not, of course, impassable, but rather famous for his suffering.
Similarly with titanic !gures such as Prometheus.
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summit . . . just like lighting, driven forth by wind through the clouds . . . "ashes out and
cracks the sky – its light, grazing with twisted "ame, striking fear into the trembling
people.”!'" A century later, the satirist Lucian, in his dialogue Voyage to the Lower World,
would in a lighter tone describe a certain tyrant as a “man beyond human” ((+"#8&4#<+=)
*,) &&,#), someone “equal to the gods” (20=4"%)), while still alive, but a “total joke”
(+(221/%,%)) when dead (Cat. 16). But the Superman has received its most famous
treatment in Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra, where Nietzsche hypostasizes the man-
beyond-man, the übermensch, who rejects the standard goods of happiness, reason, virtue,
justice, and piety, in favor of self-creation.!'# To be sure, among ancient paradigms,
Nietzsche’s Superman is closest to Lucan’s Caesar—he is “lightning” and “madness,” a
force of nature that cannot be stopped once he has been generated. Nietzsche rejects the
“petty virtues, the petty prudences, the sand-grain discretion, the ant-swarm inanity,
miserable ease, the ‘happiness of the greatest number’ ” that characterize the vulgar nobility
of the “Higher Men”—!gures not far from the aristocratic model advanced by Aristotle,
and who may include Nietzsche’s own heroes, notably Goethe and, at one time, Wagner.!'!
This amounts to an explicit rejection of the sort of democratic values embraced by
Anonymus Iamblichi and, at least in a quali!ed sense, Socrates.!'" At least as far as
Zarathustra goes, there is no explicit rejection of law as such or explicit embrace of
Calliclean +/"%&";'(, but it is no major leap of imagination to envision the possible
dangerous consequences of such a Superman if he were ever to appear in human society.
There can be little doubt that Anonymus Iamblichi would reject the Nietzschean
Superman on various grounds, not least that this !gure would be eventually overcome
by those very masses he aims to be superior to. This is because, for Anonymus Iamblichi,
the Superman who rejects democratic society does not possess true power ((6*# *# -#8*%)),
which is sustained only through respect for law and support of justice. Human nature
being what it is—weak enough to require a social contract for survival—the Superman
would !nd himself in dire straits in due course, overcome either by someone’s trickery or
by sheer mass strength. On the contrary, respect for law earns trust (+'0*,)), which is the
core mechanism that guarantees the bene!ts that accrue from the social contract, even for
the Superman:
Trust (+'0*,)) is the !rst thing that arises out of respect for law ($- *') "6&%$'()) – [trust],
which provides great bene!ts to humankind, and is to be classed among the great goods.
For the sharing of resources!'# arises out of this [sc. trust], and accordingly even if they are
scarce, they still suf!ce, because they are circulated, whereas, without it, they would not
suf!ce, even in abundance. And the changes of fortune, which pertain to resources and to
!'" Lucan, Pharsalia 1.146–154: Acer et indomitus . . . inpellens, quidquid sibi summa petenti /
obstaret . . . Qualiter expressum ventis per nubile fulmen . . . Emicuit rupitque diem populosque paventes / terruit
obliqua praestringens lumina "amma.
!'# F. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra [Zarathustra], trans. by R. J. Hollingdale (Baltimore, 1961), 1.3.
!'! Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 4.13.3.
!'" Also see Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 4.13.1: “You Higher Men, learn this from me: In the market-place no one
believes in Higher Men. And if you want to speak there, very well, do so! But the mob blink and say: ‘We are all
equal.’ ‘You Higher Men’ – thus the mob blink – ‘there are no Higher Men, we are all equal, man is but man,
before God – we are all equal!’ Before God! But now this God has died. And let us not be equal before the mob.
You Higher Men, depart from the market-place!”
!'# Literally, “money” (*? ?#3$(*(), but Anonymus Iamblichi appears to want to make a broader point about
how resources get distributed.
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quality of life, whether for better or worse, are most suitably navigated by humans when
they are underpinned by respect for law ($- *') "6&%$'()). Those who have good fortune
enjoy it in safety, and without fear of plots [against them], whereas those in turn who have
bad fortune are supported by those who have good fortune by virtue of the pooling of
resources!'$ and trust, both of which are underpinned by respect for law. Again, owing to
respect for law, humans get a release from time dedicated to political affairs (*?
+#82$(*(), and can engage in the activities (*? D#2() that relate to their own living. In
a situation in which law is respected, humans are relieved of the most unpleasant concern,
and can engage in the most pleasant; for the concern over political affairs is the most
unpleasant, whereas the concern over [one’s private] activities is the most pleasant. Again,
when they go to sleep, which is a respite for humans from troubles, they do so without fear
or troubling anxiety, and when they wake up they are similarly affected, and they do not
start up suddenly in fear, nor, in this way, after so pleasant a repose, do they wait for the
day to make itself known, but rather, without fear, they direct their untroubled concerns
toward the work that relates to their living, alleviating their cares with reliable and well-
founded expectations by [the promise of] laying hold of good things, all of which are the
consequence of respect for law.!'% And that which supplies the greatest evils to humans,
war, which leads to subjugation and enslavement – this too is a greater threat to those who
do not respect law, and less to those who do respect it. And many other goods [come
about] in a state of respect for law, [goods] which support living and become a consolation
(+(#(D:?3) for the dif!culties that arise out of it. (Anonymus Iamblichi DK 89 Fragment
7 = Iamblichus, Exhortation to Philosophy pp. 101.17–102.24 Pistelli)
For the moment, Anonymus Iamblichi leaves behind the Superman thought experiment
(he will return to it at the end of Fragment 8) to re"ect upon the good fortune/bad fortune
and public/private distinctions he raised earlier on, back in Fragments 3–4. These distinc-
tions are analyzed through the lens of “respect for law” ("6&%$'(), a concept that is typically
applied to political contexts,!'& but here also, and untypically, to personal happiness. Not
only will people who have obtained trust through respect for law bene!t in good times,
when the only real social danger is other people’s plots against themselves, probably driven
by envy; they will also weather the storm in bad times, when pooling of resources, which
depends on trust, makes it possible to survive until better times come along. Moreover,
according to Anonymus Iamblichi, respect for law engenders situations in which one is not
beset by constant political provocations and can concentrate on one’s own personal affairs,
and especially those that make one’s life better. For, he asserts, the most pleasant thing is to
engage in one’s personal activities, whereas the least pleasant is to deal with public affairs
like lawsuits. Moreover, respect for law con!rms both the natural state of sleep, which has
as its aim respite for the troubles that one encounters during the day, and the proper
!'$ If, as I think, this is what is meant by 5!( *,& $+,$,;'(&. Doubtful is the technical economic interpretation of
Musti and Mari, Anonimo, 328–30, which imports notions of circulation of currency through trade (cf. Ciriaci,
L’Anonimo, 184–5 n. 253).
!'% This sentence is problematic, and some of the vocabulary looks at !rst glance late (e.g., &&*'/7D,), which is a
technical term from Hellenistic philosophy forward). But it is possible to construe the sentence in such a way that
the term &&*'/7D,) refers not to a cognitive act per se, but rather to a promised “exchange” of goods, clearly a late
!fth-century #!" usage (e.g., Thuc. 1.120).
!'& E.g., in Xenophanes DK 21 B 2.19 and Solon Fr. 4.32 West. For a comprehensive list of comparanda to
Anonymus Iamblichi’s defense of "6&%$'( as against &&%$'(, see Ciriaci, L’Anonimo, 177–81.
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perspective on waking, which is directed towards pursuance of goods—those who have the
proper respect for law will not dally in bed, in fear of what the day might bring. The goods
guaranteed by respect for law, in turn, offer consolation for the day’s hard work. Such a
vision of respect for law ("6&%$'() is not in the strict service of aristocratic ideology, nor
some sort of appeal to the archaic ancestral constitution (e.g., in the case of Lycurgan
Sparta).!!' In the context of what has been said about the excellent man’s positive
reputation and the bestowal of bene!ts on the majority, "6&%$'( would appear to have
transformed in this text into a democratic value.!!! Hence, it is worth comparing this
defense of respect for law with a fragment of ps-Archytas’ On Law and Justice:
Therefore, the law should be engrained in the characters and the pursuits of the citizens.
For it will put the citizens in a self-suf!cient condition and distribute the portion that falls
to each in accordance with his worth. For, in this way too, the sun, being carried through
the zodiac, distributes to all on earth the proper portion of birth, nutriment, and
sustenance, by providing the good climate of the seasons as a good law ("6&%$'(), as it
were. (ps-Archytas, On Law and Justice Fragment 4.e, p. 35.21–7 Thesleff )
Ps-Archytas approves of a scenario that makes it possible for individuals within the state to
attain self-suf!ciency as much as possible, a scenario that is analogous to the way the sun
distributes the means to survival and the seasons as a "6&%$'( in nature; and, as we !nd out
in Fragment 5 of On Law and Justice, this scenario would require a ruler/magistrate
(-#?<&) to be lawful (&=$,$%)), which would require him to make correct judgments,
assign proper punishments for crimes, and offer his services in accordance with the laws,
which makes these activities align with reason.!!" Moreover, in that same fragment, laws
are said to guarantee the rights of the ruler’s subordinates. The excellent man of Anonymus
Iamblichi’s On Excellence provides a nice parallel to the ideal ruler/magistrate of ps-
Archytas’ On Law and Justice, as both realize their true purpose through the conferring
of bene!ts upon the multitudes.
Where trust (+'0*,)) is lacking, human beings are far worse off than in a situation where
it attends the respect for law: this is the case both in situations where good fortune holds
sway or where bad fortune has once again reared its ugly head. The !nal fragment of
Anonymus Iamblichi’s On Excellence, Fragment 8, appears to follow closely on what we
saw in Fragment 7, and its !rst half is tightly bound to it both thematically and
argumentatively:
Humans!!# become unable to spend time on their own activities and preoccupied with
what is most unpleasant, political affairs (+#82$(*(), rather than private activities (D#2(),
and they hoard their money because of a lack of trust and social intercourse, and they do
not share it, and hence money becomes scarce, even if it is abundant. Changes of fortune,
!!' See Hdt. 1.65.
!!! Cf. Ciriaci, L’Anonimo, 163. Contrast the position of the roughly contemporary text of Old Oligarch (ps-
Xen., Ath. Pol. 1.8–9), who sees "6&%$'( and democracy as irreconcilable.
!!" Ps-Archytas, On Law and Justice Fragment 5, p. 36.2–10 Thesleff. See p. XXX in this volume.
!!# Excising from Anonymus Iamblichi +#/*%&, which surely derives from Iamblichus’ own attempts to explain
what evils arise out of lack of respect for law (p. 102.24–5 Pistelli, *? 5’ $- *') &&%$'() -(-? &+%>('&%&*( *85"
$0*'&B, would appear to be an Iamblichean transition; Laks and Most, Sophists, 158–9, are right to remove these
lines from Diels’ text).
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for better or worse, render opposite consequences [than they would under a state of
respect for law]:!!! for good fortune is not secure in a state of lack of respect for law, but
instead is subject to plots, whereas bad fortune is not cast off, but instead is reinforced by a
lack of trust and social intercourse. External war is provoked all the more by this very
cause [sc. lack of respect for law], as is internal strife; and if it hasn’t erupted previously, it
arises then. It [sc. internal strife] in political affairs happens to arise [for humans] always
because of plots being hatched by one another, by reason of which they spend their lives
being on guard and initiating counter-plots against one another. And, when they wake up,
their concerns are not pleasant, nor when they go to sleep is their expectation pleasant, but
rather it is riddled with terror; and his awakening, full of fear and alarm, leads a human to
a sudden recollection of his evils; these, and the other aforementioned evils, are the result
of lack of respect for law.
And tyranny, an evil of so great a magnitude and character, is a result of nothing other
than lack of respect for law. Some people, who conjecture incorrectly, think that a tyrant
comes to power from some other cause, and that humans deprived of their freedom are
not themselves the causes of it, but [that they are deprived of their freedom] because they
were forced by the tyrant once he has come to power. But their reasoning is incorrect; for
whoever believes that a king or tyrant arises out of anything other than a lack of respect for
law and greed is a fool. It is whenever all humans turn to baseness that this happens; for it
is impossible for humans to thrive (@'&) without laws and justice. So when these two
things, law and justice, relinquish the multitude ($- *%. +/34%:) $-/'+:), at that very time
the administration and supervision of these things bid a retreat to a single man. For how
else could sovereignty devolve to a single man, unless the law, which is bene!cial to the
multitude, is banished? This man, who will dismantle justice and abolish the law that is
common and bene!cial to all, needs to be made of adamantium, if he intends to strip the
multitude of humans of these things – one man against many. But if he were to be made of
"esh and similar to the rest [of humans], he would not have the capacity to do these things;
on the contrary, only by re-establishing them when they have relinquished [viz. the
multitude] could he attain sovereignty. That is the reason why it escapes the notice of
some people when it [sc. a tyrant coming to power] happens.!!" (Anonymus Iamblichi DK
89 Fragment 8 = Iamblichus, Exhortation to Philosophy pp. 102.26–104.14 Pistelli)
In the !rst half of this fragment, Anonymus Iamblichi ventures an extensive critique of lack
of respect for law (&&%$'(), exposing its close ties to strife, both internal (as civic con"ict)
and external (as war). When the instruments of good society, trust (+'0*,)) and social
intercourse ($+,$,;'(), are lost, the city is threatened by civil discord and external war, the
latter of which is the worst thing human society is subject to. Again, and as we saw earlier,
Anonymus Iamblichi focuses on the effects of social disruption on the individual: absence
of respect for law eventuates deeply troubled sleep, paranoia, and petty desire for revenge.
Anonymus Iamblichi’s insistence on the importance of these instruments of good
society is remarkable and relatively unique within the context of late !fth-century Greek
!!! Dillon and Gergel (Sophists, 317), correctly (in my opinion) draw the contrast with Fragment 7 at
p. 101.23–5 Pistelli. There is no need, pace Laks and Most (Sophists, 158, n. 1), to postulate a lacuna here.
!!" It is possible that the lines that follow (p. 104.14–20 Pistelli) also derive from Anonymus Iamblichi, but I do
not include them because the appeal to happiness ("65(,$%&'() that follows does not relate to any of the content of
the aforementioned fragments. Rather, it appears to be Iamblichus’ inference.
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culture. For comparison, in Gorgias’ Defense of Palamedes, trust, once it has been lost,
cannot be replaced:
Life is not livable for a man deprived of trustworthiness (>'%) 51 %6 >,<*#) +'0*"<)
$0*"#7$1&7). For someone might be able to restore one who has lost his valuables, been
deposed from tyranny, or been exiled from his fatherland; but someone who has lost
trustworthiness (+'0*,& &+%>(/9&) could never acquire it again. (Gorgias, Defense of
Palamedes 21, DK 82 B 11a; trans. by Laks and Most)
Elsewhere, in the Funeral Oration, Gorgias asserts that it is friendships that are properly
respected through trustworthiness (+'0*,)).!!# But, for the most part, it seems that Gorgias
is concerned with the attainment of trustworthiness for the sake of interpersonal
"ourishing—he does not go as far as Anonymus Iamblichi who understands trust as a
fundamental instrument for social stability. On the whole, trust itself is not usually counted
by ancient thinkers as a mechanism of such great importance to the preservation of the
democratic state and the individual who lives within it.!!$ From this perspective,
Anonymus Iamblichi was the !rst !gure to identify the deep importance of trust (both
interpersonal and general) for the successful operation of democratic government—a
commonplace assumption in political theory today.!!%
The surviving portion of Anonymus Iamblichi’s On Excellence concludes with a rheto-
rical tour-de-force, a comprehensive rejection of lack of respect for law (&&%$'().!!& In this
case, the Anonymus Iamblichi imagines what sorts of scenarios produce a tyrant, who
would seek to annul the laws and expel justice from his regime. Some people, he says,
erroneously believe that tyrannies arise from some cause other than lack of respect for law,
and that it is the tyrant’s power to strip individual freedom that sets them on the path of
destruction; on the contrary, lack of respect for law, which entails the loss of individual
freedom, is what produces the tyrant.!"' The question for Anonymus Iamblichi is what
causes lack of respect for law: this is “baseness” (-(-'() spread throughout the human
population, the very same baseness that, back in Fragment 3, is understood to be the
opposite of excellence, and which implies the rejection of law and justice. When baseness is
wrought over the people, law and justice are said almost poetically to “relinquish” them
($-/'+:), a distant echo of Hesiod’s myth concerning the vicious men of the Iron Age, in
which the goddesses of social benefaction, Shame (E25/)) and Retribution (F1$"0,)),
abandon (>*%& +#%/,+=&*’) men for Olympus, whereas Justice (G'-7) alone remains to
dish out the terrible deserts (Works and Days ll. 175–224). Once this has happened, there is
a power vacuum, and the tyrant is there to !ll it, taking over the administering and
!!# DK 82 B 6.
!!$ Mari (Anonimo, 277), attempts to show that trust (“!ducia”) has a similar signi!cance to Isocrates’ idealized
constitution in the Areopagiticus (33–5), but she overstates the case.
!!% See, for example, the essays collected in M. E. Warren, Democracy and Trust (Cambridge, 1999).
!!& Mari (Anonimo, 318) notices the similarities to the Pythagorean tenet presented by Iamblichus (VP 171,
p. 96.6–7 Deubner-Klein) of “lend assistance to law, and !ght against lawlessness” (&=$7 >%74")& -(! &&%$'F
+%/"$")&).
!"' It is dif!cult to know precisely who these people were; in the Constitutional Debate, Herodotus (3.82) has a
group of Persian elites choose the next king, Darius; and this choice is con!rmed through trickery (3.84–6).
Contrary to both Anonymus Iamblichi and those !gures he would debate, Plato holds (R. 8, 562a7–564a8) that
tyranny emerges precisely from democratic freedom within the cycle of constitutions.
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supervision of the justice system and the laws. He immediately sets out to dismantle the
system of justice and to annul the laws that bequeath a common bene!t to the multitude. If,
so Anonymus Iamblichi asserts, that tyrant is anything less than a Superman, made of
adamantium, he will surely fail, as one man ultimately cannot compete against many.
The thought experiment involving the Superman comes to an abrupt end here, as all
men are indeed made of "esh, and hence a tyrant, being violable, will achieve nothing if
he does not institute law and justice once again and base his regime on them. So, too,
Anonymus Iamblichi’s text grounds to a halt, apparently leaving off in medias res, with
no clear return to the issue of excellence. From the point of view of world politics in
2019, it is remarkable how prescient Anonymus Iamblichi’s statements about the rise of
a corrupt form of populism and the ascendancy of tyranny are, and the con!dence with
which the author asserts that the tyrant will be rendered wholly ineffectual in the absence
of a robust support for law and justice. Political theorists today, who would seek to !nd
wisdom in the ideas of the ancients, would do well to look beyond Plato’s aristocratically
in"ected description of the rise of the tyrant in Republic 8, and to On Excellence of
Anonymus Iamblichi, one of the only surviving philosophical defenses of democracy that
survives from the ancient world.
5. Conclusions
Subsequent to quotation of these long stretches of Anonymus Iamblichi’s On Excellence,
Iamblichus re"ects once again upon their value for his own project of exhortation to
philosophy:
If, therefore, lack of respect for law is a cause of so great a number of bad things, and
respect for law is so great a good, it is not possible to encounter happiness in any other
way, unless someone were to assign law as authority for his own life ("2 $3 *,) &=$%&
821$%&( +#%0*30(,*% *%. %2-"'%: >'%:). And this [sc. law] is right reason (/=2%) 5#4=)),
commanding what one ought to do, and forbidding what should not be done, in the whole
cosmos, in city-states, in private homes, and for each individual himself in relation to
himself. If, therefore, it is impossible to learn this kind of reason, which concerns good and
bad things, and noble and shameful things (+"#! &2(4/& -(! -(-/& 4&*( -(! -(//& -(!
(20?#/&), in any other way, and to bring them, once they have been recognized, to
perfection, unless one does philosophy perfectly, then it is for the sake of these things
[sc. good and bad, and noble and shameful things] that one must practice (&0-7*1%&)
philosophy to the greatest extent among human pursuits. (Iamblichus, Exhortation to
Philosophy 20, p. 104.14–25 Pistelli)
Iamblichus’ !nale nicely rounds up the material presented in the fragments of Anonymus
Iamblichi by returning to his assertion, prior to the citation of Fragment 1, that “it is not
possible to learn these things without knowing virtue (&#"*3), to which we refer both the
capacity and the use of the laws, and pro!ciency in virtue obtains by means of philosophy,
with the result that philosophy is an authority (82"$9&) in relation to this [sc. virtue] as
well.” For Iamblichus, law, which is right reason (/=2%) 5#4=)), is to be an authority over
human life; human life is regulated by law and laws, which can achieve their potential only
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when virtue is present; and, !nally, philosophy is the authority that provides guidance in
relation to virtue.!"!Hence, for Iamblichus, we have a chain of philosophical functions that
binds theoretical to practical philosophy: philosophy is necessary for the attainment of
virtue; virtue makes potent universal law, conceived of as right reason, and individual laws,
in their applications; law and laws regulate human life; and the regulation of human life
under law concerns good and !ne things, which can be known and brought to their
consummate forms only when philosophy is practiced (&0-7*1%&).
It becomes clear, then, that Iamblichus has integrated the arguments of On Excellence
chie"y because they provide him with support for his case that there is a strong continuity
between metaphysics and ethics. The distinctive emphasis on the practice (-0-70,)) of
excellence in Anonymus Iamblichi’s text, which can only be associated in pre-Platonic
philosophy with the thought of the Ionian philosophers Protagoras and Democritus,
enables Iamblichus to project this continuity onto his exhortation to philosophy. This
is a deft creative misreading of Anonymus Iamblichi’s own arguments, which encourage
not the practice of philosophy, but the development of the constituent parts of excel-
lence (wisdom, courage, and eloquence). This process of appropriation has served very
bene!cial ends for scholars today: we possess a lost text that can (with some reliability)
be dated to classical Greece, which presents a unique philosophical view on excellence
(&#"*3) and its parts; which advances a defense of law and justice by appealing to both
value and instrumental reasoning; which carefully differentiates between nature and
fortune; which provides an early re"ection upon social emotions, the weaknesses of the
human condition, and the nature of true power; which develops the !rst substantial
“Superman” thought experiment; and which, !nally, develops the earliest extant and
most philosophically sustained defense of democracy and the democratic social order,
almost wholly unattested in ancient Greek philosophical literature. For these reasons
alone, On Excellence of Anonymus Iamblichi should be integrated into scholarly dis-
cussions of ancient Greek democracy and its ideology, alongside more famous passages
such as Otanes’ speech in the Persian Constitutional Debate (Herodotus, Histories
3.80–2), Pericles’ Funeral Oration (Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War
2.34–42), and Theseus’ speech in Euripides’ Suppliants (ll. 426–62). Simply because
we do not know for sure who its author was, this does not mean On Excellence does not
feature forceful and impressive philosophical arguments for why law and justice, which
are guaranteed by the cultivation of civic excellence (&#"*3), must be preserved and
supported, if the citizens who live in a democratic regime, and the democratic regime
itself, are to "ourish.!""
!"! At the end of On Wisdom (Fragment 5, p. 45.1–4 Thesleff = Iambl. Protr. 4, p. 23.1–5 Pistelli), ps-Archytas
claims that someone who sets out to pursue philosophy “will set out and arrive at the end of the course, connecting
the beginnings with the conclusions, and !nding out why god is the beginning, end, and middle of all the things-
that-are de!ned in accordance with justice and right reason” (-(*? 5'-(& *" -(! *#& 5#4#& /=2%&). The latter phrase
would seem to be euphemistic for “law” (&=$%)). For the Stoic concept of 5#4#) /=2%) and its origins in Platonic
and Aristotelian philosophy, see generally J. Moss, “Right Reason in Plato and Aristotle: On the Meaning of
Logos,” Phronesis 59 (2014), 181–230.
!"" With this paper, I ful!l a promise made to Monte Ransome Johnson almost a decade ago to write a
“comprehensive” treatment of Anonymus Iamblichi in English. Since he has been the initial impetus for the
writing of this chapter, thanks go to him !rst and foremost. Further thanks go to Giulia De Cesaris and Ben
Harriman for support, P. J. Rhodes for a keen eye, and David Wolfsdorf for encouragement and suggestions for
improvement.
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